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Abstract  
This project focuses on assisted-dying policy in Canada; assisted-dying was legalized in 
February 2015 as per the Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) (2015) ruling, because the 
longstanding blanket prohibition of assisted-dying was found to be unconstitutional as it violated 
the plaintiff’s s. 7 right to life, liberty and security of the person. In June 2016, Bill C-14: An Act 
to Amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (2016) was enacted 
federally. One of the main concerns from various sources regarding this legislation is that an 
individual’s natural death must be reasonably foreseeable to access MAID. Bill C-14 (2016) 
excludes individuals who do not have a ‘foreseeable natural death’ from accessing medical 
assistance in dying.  The current policy has not found a balance between the need to protect 
vulnerable populations from becoming victims to assisted-dying and is not accessible to those 
who are suffering from non-terminal illnesses or are deemed vulnerable. 
The methodology used in this research was a policy analysis, using court cases/rulings, 
federal legislation, provincial policies, transcripts, and legislative backgrounds/summaries. In 
addition, the co-investigator conducted two one-on-one semi-structured interviews to supplement 
the main data.  
Keywords: assisted-dying, physician assisted-dying, medical assistance in dying (MAID), 
euthanasia, Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Bill C-14 (2016), life, liberty, security of the 
person, Charter rights, suspended declaration of invalidity, principles of fundamental justice, 
Carter v. Canada, Julia Lamb, Rodriguez v. British Columbia, Canada v. Bedford, advanced 
consent, mature minors, mentally ill, vulnerability, disability, terminally ill, reasonably 
foreseeable, Charter dialogue, policy, law, unconstitutional, violation of rights, s. 7 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 2 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor throughout this process, Prof. Irina Ceric. 
This journey throughout honours was met with many bumps along the way and I want to thank 
you for your compassion and help in motivating me to complete this project. You have been a 
wealth of knowledge and I have learned so much more from working with you. Thank you for 
being my supervisor and thank you for helping me stay on the right track.  
Mike Larsen, I want to thank you for your encouragement throughout this entire project and for 
the support that I have received from you throughout my academic career; I would not have 
applied for Honours without your recommendation and so thank you for reading and providing 
feedback on so many of my assisted-dying papers. 
Dr. Tara Lyons thank you for being my internal reader, I really appreciate it.  
Dr. Charmaine Perkins thank you for being my external reader, I am very grateful.  
To my colleagues and friends in Honours—thanks for commiserating with me and encouraging 
me to finish this project!   
To my close friends, family and Scott—thank you for supporting me and encouraging me to 
follow my dreams. By now you’ll all be fed up of discussing every single news article, piece of 
data or policy that I wanted to stay up all night talking about. Thank you for having open ears, 
and telling me to get my work done.  
To Bucky (my grandmother). Thanks for educating me and sharing your thoughts on right-to-die 
laws. Hopefully this finished project will brighten your ‘golden years.’ Thanks for encouraging 
me to pursue this and thanks for listening to me read all my drafts!  
Thank you to the Librarians at both the Surrey and Langley KPU campuses, specifically Chris 
Burns; the documentaries and books I’ve requested were very useful in this project.  
Thank you to those individuals that participated in my research, the interviews were one of my 
favourite parts of this project and I finally got to ask questions I was dying to have answers to.   
Thank you to all the others whom I haven’t named above for helping me along the way 
throughout this project.  
 
 
 
 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 3 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... 1 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. 2 
Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................................... 4 
Chapter 2 Research Data ..................................................................................................... 12 
Chapter 3  Interview Findings ............................................................................................. 38 
Chapter 4 Literature Review ............................................................................................... 46 
Chapter 5 Data Analysis ....................................................................................................... 63 
Chapter 6 Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 85 
References .............................................................................................................................. 92 
Appendix A ............................................................................................................................ 98 
Appendix B .......................................................................................................................... 101 
Appendix C .......................................................................................................................... 104 
Appendix D  ......................................................................................................................... 105 
Appendix E .......................................................................................................................... 107 
 
 
 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 4 
Chapter 1 
Introduction: Current Context of Assisted-Dying Law in Canada  
Before 2015, Canadians were unable to receive medical-assistance in dying. This was 
because of the prohibitive ban that prevented physicians from aiding or counseling an individual 
in their suicide. These acts were prohibited under section 241 of the Criminal Code R.S.C., 1985, 
c. C-46 [hereinafter Criminal Code] until the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Carter v. 
Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 [hereinafter Carter, 2015] that 
this legislation infringed upon section 7 of the Charter. Bill C-14 (2016) excludes individuals 
who do not have a ‘foreseeable natural death’ from accessing medical assistance in dying.  The 
current policy has not found a balance between the need to protect vulnerable populations from 
becoming victims to assisted-dying and is not accessible to those who are suffering from non-
terminal illnesses or are deemed vulnerable. Vulnerability is a difficult concept for legislation to 
define and this is representative of the misguided blanket protection that has occurred in the past. 
The consequences of not acting on the recommendations provided by those who have completed 
thorough research, as well as ignoring the voices in the discussion will ultimately lead to 
Canadian citizens to lack access to a now legal right, and thus, infringe on the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms.  
This topic was chosen for the requirements of an Honours Thesis in Criminology at 
Kwantlen Polytechnic University. This topic has been an interest of mine for about seven years. I 
was first introduced to the medico-legal aspect of assisted-dying whilst being admitted early into 
a Law 12 course in the beginning of high-school. I first learned of Sue Rodriguez (who is 
discussed within this thesis) with complete shock that it was possible to be denied the right to die 
with dignity. This was nearing the time that I began caregiving for my elderly grandmother who 
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has been living in a state of suffering for the past 7 years. Quality of life can begin to diminish 
with age very quickly and take away a person’s independence and dignity. The ultimate 
incurable ‘disease’ is age itself and it has vastly opened my eyes to the importance of dignity, 
quality of life, and autonomy. It has been my passion throughout my time at Kwantlen 
Polytechnic University to navigate and research different aspects of assisted-dying and to follow 
this timely and very significant aspect of Canadian law and policy.  
As an introduction to this thesis, there are three definitions to consider:  
Assisted dying is a generic term referring to a form of euthanasia; it is defined by the Report of 
the Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying as “the act of intentionally ending 
one’s life with the assistance of another person who provides the knowledge, means, or both, of 
doing so” (Ogilvie & Oliphant, 2016, p. 9). 
Physician-assisted dying (PAD), is another term for assisted dying, referring to the fact that the 
doctor is assisting in the suicide (Ogilvie & Oliphant, 2016).  
Medical assistance in dying (MAID) is the terminology used in Quebec. MAID is also the term 
used in the federal Bill C-14: An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related 
amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying) 2016.  
Terminology regarding assisted-dying has been widely debated, so, as recommended by 
the Special Joint Committee, MAID or ‘medical assistance in dying’ was argued to be the best 
term used in Canadian legislation (Nicol & Tiedemann, 2016, p. 3). This term fits the need of the 
legislation because it “reflects the reality that health care teams, consisting of nurses, 
pharmacists, and other health care professionals are also involved in the process of assisted 
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dying” (Ogilvie & Oliphant, 2016, p. 10). Hereinafter, the terms that will be used 
interchangeably are assisted dying, PAD/physician-assisted dying and MAID/medical assistance 
in dying. These terms have been chosen to fit alongside the terminology used in Bill C-14 (2016) 
along with other publications.   
Assisted dying has been a topic of discussion in Canada for many years, but up until very 
recently, it had not been legalized. Now that medical assistance in dying (MAID) has been 
implemented into Canadian law and policy, it has created a debate about the access and the 
process that is outlined in Canadian policy. Bill C-14 (2016) introduced legislation to regulate 
assisted dying for those who have a ‘reasonably foreseeable natural death’ (Bill C-14, 2016). 
This created changes to the Criminal Code of Canada that formerly prohibited the choice to help 
one to end their life as an assisted suicide (Browne & Russell, 2016). A key theme over the years 
has been that the prohibitive ban on PAD was strongly in favour of protecting the ‘sanctity of 
life’ (Chan & Somerville, 2016, p. 150) principle and protecting vulnerable populations from 
being subject to acts of euthanasia; this was one of the key principles that prevented the ban from 
being overturned in 1993 in Rodriguez (Downie & Bern, 2008). Section 241 of the Criminal 
Code was being considered from time to time to be a ‘blanket prohibition’ since it would 
ultimately protect Canadians, including those who are deemed vulnerable. The fight to legalize 
assisted-dying has made its presence known in the SCC through Charter challenges in some very 
renowned cases, specifically Rodriguez v. British Columbia (1993) and Carter v. Canada 
(2015).1  
																																								 																				
1	It is also important to note that Quebec produced their own province wide bill allowing assisted-dying in 
2014 (Bill 52, 2014), but this policy was not a part of the data used in this research project.  
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In February 2015, the Supreme Court’s ruling Carter v. Canada legalized PAD, forcing 
the federal government to reconsider the policy nationally. The ruling explained that the 
prohibitive bans on PAD infringed upon Charter rights, specifically of section 7 (Chochinov & 
Frazee, 2016). This is monumental for policy in Canada, but it is arguable that making these 
policies become practically implemented. Some individuals that are suffering considerably do 
not actually have an imminent death, so they ultimately do not meet the criteria that must be met 
within current Canadian policy (Chochinov & Frazee, 2016). Therefore, they cannot access this 
right—however, Julia Lamb and Robyn Moro (among other plaintiffs that have come forward) 
are arguing that they would like to be able to access this right, since, they do not want to lose 
their autonomy, dignity or sense of self (Chan & Somerville, 2016 & Globe & Mail, 2017). 
There is uncertainty whether Canadians will be able to make an autonomous decision to receive 
MAID with the new policy in Canada.  
According to Dying with Dignity Canada (DWD) (2016), members of the Canadian 
population have changed their views drastically in the last few years, understanding that there are 
many factors that may invoke damage to an individual’s quality of life, dignity, and autonomy 
(Dying with Dignity Canada, 2016). Thus, the call for these rights has now been answered. The 
importance of MAID research is now bigger than fighting for the decriminalization of PAD. 
Now, it is imperative to recognize that Canadian are living without the quality of life that they 
wish to live with, without access to treatment (palliative) (Chochinov & Frazee, 2016); or 
without the ability to end their life in a humane and dignified way. The federal legislation (Bill 
C-14, 2016) is representative of this, since those that do not suffer from an irremediable disease 
cannot access this right and the criteria for PAD should not be discriminatory. 
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Bill C-14 (2016) is a piece of legislation that is failing Canadians that wish to access 
MAID, and ultimately, it is unconstitutional legislation that replaces the previous legislation. 
However, with Carter v. Canada (2015) it became apparent that the SCC has recognized the 
acceptance of assisted-dying and placed a greater value of living a life of quality, with self-
determination and liberty, rather than simply being alive or living. Moreover, the prohibitive ban 
impacted the entire population, not just providing those deemed vulnerable with protection 
(Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 86), therefore, it was violating s. 7 rights to life, liberty and 
security of the person and deemed unconstitutional. Bill C-14 (2016) is just a revised way to 
prohibit individuals from making autonomous decisions regarding their life, and the policy quite 
clearly shows that the federal government does not wish to be held accountable for the 
possibility of vulnerable individuals being taken advantage of (aside from the statistics from 
around the world where MAID policies are working); Bill C-14 (2016) is new legislation, with 
the same purpose as the blanket prohibition of assisted-dying, and is therefore, a disgraceful 
representation of the necessary dialogue that should happen between a Supreme Court ruling and 
policy makers that are initiating a new policy or making amendments. Bill C-14 (2016) does not 
provide assurances for Canadians who wish to die with dignity, it only creates more uncertainty. 
I would argue further that the job of policy makers is not to determine who is vulnerable, but to 
create a policy that ensures that medical practitioners are providing assessments that do so; doing 
this would help MAID become accessible for those without a ‘reasonably foreseeable’ death. It 
is likely that Bill C-14 (2016) will eventually be found unconstitutional too, because of the 
‘reasonably foreseeable’ criterion (Dying with Dignity Canada, 2016) It may take the federal 
government a long time to amend Bill C-14 (2016) so that it fits the needs of all members of 
society (with inclusivity of minorities such as those with disabilities and others that are classified 
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as vulnerable, such as those with psychological disorders). But in the meantime, it will be 
unfortunate if there are Canadians who will take their own lives prematurely or live in an 
intolerable state of suffering because of it.  
In the following chapters, a thorough policy review will be undertaken, using court cases, 
parliamentary documents, reports, and legislation to help position and understand how policy has 
been implemented in Canada, and whether it provides safeguards for those who are vulnerable 
and if it is accessible to these populations. In addition, a literature review that examines the 
Charter, disability studies and vulnerability theory will also be conducted to position the 
methodology section of this thesis. There will be a short chapter of interview data to supplement 
the policy data, and to address the applicability of policy. In the analysis chapter, the literature 
and methodology section to the policy and data will be discussed. This thesis will close with a 
short discussion and conclusion of the thesis findings and provide some recommendations and 
explanations for future changes as well as major shortcomings.  
Methodology 
A qualitative mixed methods approach was used in this research project, using a policy 
analysis and two semi-structured interviews to supplement the main data source. This 
methodology is the most useful method to explore aspects of vulnerability and MAID policy in 
Canada because the policy has been enacted in the recent past and has been under much public 
scrutiny. The documents collected for this research were policy documents such as legislation, 
transcripts on legislative discussions, reports from special committees and provinces, summaries 
and backgrounds published by the government, as well as court cases, legal documents and other 
related materials.  
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 A policy analysis was necessary for this kind of project because the legislation put into 
effect (Bill C-14, 2016, MAID) is not yet a year old, and so it was important to assess whether 
the legislation followed the SCC ruling (Carter). This policy analysis also required a thorough 
literature review to find theoretical perspectives to support, uncover and analyze the data 
collected. Using a policy analysis was useful to uncovering answers why and how the policies 
implemented for assisted-dying in Canada are applied to vulnerable populations, and whether or 
not they are successfully implemented. Gilson (2014) explains that policy analysis is derived 
from three main elements: understanding the dialogue between institutions, who’s impacted by 
the policy, and the foundation of the policy (p. iii1). Combined with qualitative research, a policy 
analysis can be a useful tool for whether a policy is applicable to the audience which it is meant 
to reach (Gilson, 2014); in addition, there are steps that are used to conduct a policy analysis, and 
these methods were applicable to this research project. One of the first steps of this project was 
to identify important literature to be reviewed that was applicable to the assisted dying debate. 
This provided an abundance of research data—data which derived from numerous angles that 
were all relevant to assisted-dying but not all applicable to this research. So, a challenge that was 
faced was directing the research and simultaneously considering which articles, policies, 
guidelines and scholarly literature were useful to my project. This does not mean that this 
research is exhaustive, because it truly is not, but with the data used and chosen, the research 
speaks volumes to how the policy came to be, and how it can be improved. This task involved 
reviewing each document and determining whether it was applicable, but also which key themes 
were found and notes were taken. The final step taken in this project was to synthesize the main 
points of the findings and interpret it, with the hopes of creating further discussion on the topic.  
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Semi-Structured Interviews 
The second method of research used in this project was one-on-one interviews following a 
semi-structured script. The interviews were with Dr. Ellen Wiebe, a physician at UBC and Cory 
Ruf of Dying with Dignity Canada. These interviews were meant to supplement the main data 
source and so they helped to fill in some of the missing gaps within the research. The goal for the 
interview portion of the research was to conduct between 4 and 10 interviews. The interview 
methods portion of this thesis and the interview findings are discussed in Chapter 3. An 
important point to note is that the interview participants had to already be involved in the MAID 
debate, either through work or through advocacy. 
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Chapter 2  
Research Data: Law, Policy, and Key Organizations 
This chapter will introduce the data used in the policy analysis method of this research. It 
will explain the major court rulings on assisted-dying in Canada, present the newly enacted 
legislation and some policies and federal organizations that have helped to transition the 
legalization of MAID into practice, and illuminate some of the main recommendations made by 
committees enacted federally prior to Bill C-14 (2016) becoming law.  
Rodriguez v. British Columbia: A Landmark Decision 
In 1991, Sue Rodriguez was diagnosed with ALS, often known as Lou Gehrig’s disease. 
This is a debilitating disease and would cause Rodriguez to suffer immensely and eventually 
become paralyzed (Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 1993). At this time, Switzerland was the only 
country that had legalized assisted-dying (Beaudoin, 2006). Rodriguez took her case to the B.C. 
Supreme Court seeking to invalidate section 241 of the Criminal Code which was prohibiting her 
from receiving assistance in ending her life; this request was made because of the harsh reality of 
her diagnosis—that eventually she would no longer be able to take her life, and she wished to do 
so in an autonomous and dignified way.  Her request was dismissed, so she appealed to the B.C. 
Court of Appeal, and was met with the same response. In March 1993, Rodriguez appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), arguing that s. 241 of the Criminal Code was violating her 
section 7, 12 and 15(1) Charter rights. Section 241 of the Criminal Code states that:  
Everyone who ... (b) aids or abets a person to commit suicide, whether suicide ensues or 
not, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
fourteen years (Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended.) 
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Rodriguez argued that her s. 7 rights were being infringed upon because she was unable 
to take her own life without the assistance of another person and therefore her rights to ‘life, 
liberty and security of the person’ were violated. Rodriguez further argued that her s. 12 right to 
not be ‘subjected to any cruel and unusual punishment’ was being violated because without 
receiving assistance in her death, she would be experiencing intolerable suffering, for longer than 
necessary—this would be unnecessarily cruel. Finally, Rodriguez claimed that s. 15 of the 
Charter was violated because individuals have the “right to equal protection and equal benefit of 
the law without discrimination based on …physical disability.” Sue Rodriguez was unable to 
take her own life and needed the assistance of another individual to do so, therefore, by depriving 
her of this right it is discriminatory, since she could not physically commit the action herself 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 520-523).  
The SCC issued a 5-4 decision on September 30, 1993, ruling that s. 241 of the Criminal 
Code was constitutional, and that the blanket prohibition of assisted-dying in Canada was meant 
to protect the vulnerable and the sanctity of life (Rodriguez,1993, p. 521). In Rodriguez, the 
majority SCC found that her s. 7 rights were not infringed upon because the law was in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 521). The SCC’s 
majority decision regarding the s. 12 challenge was that the government was not controlling 
Rodriguez by prohibiting her suicide—and so they were not prolonging her suffering. Rodriguez 
was not receiving ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ from the government itself, so this was not a 
violation of her rights (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 522). Regarding whether Rodriguez’s s. 15 rights 
were violated, the SCC stated:  
It is preferable in this case not to decide the difficult and important issues raised by the 
application of s. 15 of the Charter, but rather to assume that the prohibition on assisted 
suicide in s. 241(b) of the Code infringes s. 15, since any infringement of s. 15 by s. 241 
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(b) is clearly justified under s. 1 of the Charter.  (Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 1993, p. 
522).  
 
The majority of the SCC found that “the prohibition on assisted suicide in s. 241(b) of the 
Code infringes s. 15, since any infringement of s. 15 by 241(b) is clearly justified under s. 1 of 
the Charter” (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 6)). The importance to society to have a blanket prohibition on 
assisted-suicide was to provide safeguards for those who may become vulnerable, therefore, by 
withholding the right to assisted-suicide, it prevented a ‘slippery slope’ (Rodriguez v. British 
Columbia, 1993, p. 42) from occurring and protected those who are vulnerable, and fulfilled the 
intended purpose of the law.  
The minority of the SCC felt that s. 7 rights were being infringed upon by upholding s. 
241 of the Criminal Code and that the infringement was not in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice (Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 1993, p. 6).  Justices L’Heureux-Dubé and 
McLachlin dissented that: 
Parliament has put into force a legislative scheme which makes suicide lawful but 
assisted suicide unlawful. The effect of this distinction is to deny to some people the 
choice of ending their lives solely because they are physically unable to do so, preventing 
them from exercising the autonomy over their bodies available to other people. The 
denial of the ability to end their life is arbitrary and hence amounts to a limit on the right 
to security of the person which does not comport with the principles of fundamental 
justice. (Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 1993, p. 6.) 
Chief Justice Lamer and Justice Cory were also among the dissenting Judges stating that the 
importance of autonomy was a right under s. 7’s guarantee of security of the person. Subjecting 
an individual to suffer intolerably and that ‘’dying with dignity’ should be a protected right as is 
the right to life (Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 1993, p. 6). 
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Arguments against Canada’s new policy on assisted-dying are represented by the most 
recent Charter challenge, the ongoing Lamb v. Canada (2016) case since this Canadian woman 
could suffer for years on end before her disease ultimately takes her life naturally. Lamb is 
challenging the current legislation for PAD (Bill C-14) which is not addressing some individuals 
while still considering them to be vulnerable; these individuals unable to access MAID are: 
mature minors, mentally ill persons, non-terminally ill people, individuals with disabilities 
without a natural foreseeable death. MAID is inaccessible to these individuals because they do 
not meet the criteria, or, the legislation simply did not include them initially. Instead, an 
independent review was initiated 180 days after the enactment of Bill C-14 (2016) to assess 
mentally ill, mature minors, and advanced directives. This significantly undermines the Carter v. 
Canada (2015) ruling and arguably is infringing on the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms—specifically the right to life, liberty, and security of the person (s. 7), as well as the 
right to not be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment (s. 12) and finally that the law would be 
applied without discrimination (s. 15 (1)). These sections of the Charter will be thoroughly 
discussed later in the analysis and literature review sections; however, bear in mind that these 
sections of the Charter are at the very heart of PAD policy and will likely be challenged again if 
they are not substantially addressed in the near future.  
Several other countries have legalized assisted-dying, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Switzerland and several states in the U.S.A. Some of these policies have been enacted for at least 
fifteen years (Collier, 2009). Since the enactment of PAD policy, the Netherlands (Vogel, 2012, 
p. E19) and Belgium have made amendments to policy, allowing individuals that are not 
terminally ill to make requests for PAD. Some notable changes to the policies in these countries 
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are the age restrictions being lifted (Chazan, 2016), and as recent as in September 2016, the first 
terminally ill minor received PAD in Belgium (Chazan, 2016).  
Individuals opposing legislation provide the argument that policy makers are justifying 
their implementation of PAD policy because it is helping to resolve the issue that there are not 
enough palliative care facilities to help Canadians nearing the end of their lives. In fact, Vogel 
(2012) notes that “as many as 70% of Canadians lack access to hospice and palliative care and 
what programs exist are uncoordinated and unevenly distributed across the country” (p. E19). 
Although the access to proper palliative care and hospices may not prevent PAD from occurring 
(p. E19), the model of PAD in Oregon provides that these end-of-life managing options are 
necessary alongside PAD policy (E19). This ties in with the ‘slippery slope’ arguments of groups 
opposing PAD policy, because now that assisted suicide has been decriminalized, the fight for 
others to receive PAD, such as those who suffer from mental illnesses or other grievous pain 
(Vogel, 2012, E20).  
The ‘slippery slope’ arguments are related to this; the ‘slippery slope’ argument related to 
PAD is that if assisted-dying becomes legal (which it has) “then there will be a slide towards the 
bottom of a slippery slope and many clearly unacceptable practices will become prevalent…we 
will soon find ourselves unable to prevent involuntary euthanasia of the elderly, the disabled, and 
other vulnerable individuals” (Downie, 2004, p. 117). Once the legalization has occurred, it is 
deemed that it will only be a matter of time before someone falls vulnerable to the policy (Vogel, 
p. E20). On one hand it has been true, more individuals are being able to access end of life 
decisions, to protect their dignity, autonomy and right to equal treatment without unnecessary 
suffering.  On the other hand, to what extent are end of life decisions made by the patient and not 
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the physician assisting in it—or where will the line be drawn for whether it is a choice of pain 
management or euthanasia (Collier, 2009, p. 464).  
Joint chairs on the  Special Joint Committee on PAD, Ogilvie and Oliphant (2016), 
produced a parliamentary report with recommendations for PAD policy, directly addressing the 
fact that though Carter v. Canada’s ruling did not specifically pertain to cases where an 
individual was mentally ill or non-terminally ill patients, it is in the best interest of the legislation 
to address the importance of recognizing other grievous conditions such as severe mental illness, 
or non-terminal illnesses (p. 13). Ogilvie and Oliphant’s (2016) report produced 21 detailed 
suggestions on how to frame PAD policy and implement it successfully (p. 35-36). The report 
noted that it is imperative that vulnerable populations are protected and that PAD 
implementation should be alongside furthering palliative care and other end of life means, so that 
PAD is not the only option available (p. 3). Ogilvie and Oliphant (2016) noted that an important 
part of policy to address is an option for advanced directives for those who are not yet in the final 
stages of their lives because the request for PAD is a lengthy process.  Ultimately, one may wish 
to ensure that they have their right before it becomes inaccessible to them—such as in cases 
where an individual loses competency, or the ability to give consent (pp. 21-22). This is only the 
beginning of a very lengthy part of PAD discussion, and is arguably one of the most important 
aspects to consider when addressing the policy. 
With the legalization of PAD, some physicians may still have their own moral beliefs 
regarding assisted-dying. Some physicians prefer not to participate or offer this form of medical 
care it has been discussed and regarded as an important aspect to the changes in legislation. 
Physicians will be able to refuse for legitimate reasons to not aid a patient in any way to receive 
PAD (Moulton, 2015, p. E426). This is a protection provided by the Canadian Medical 
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Protective Association (CMPA) (Moulton, 2015) and it will likely be a guarantee that some 
physicians find applicable to their own religious or personal ethics (p. E426). Finally, Wagner 
and Pearl (2016) infer from the Carter v. Canada decision that the Supreme Court did not rule 
that physicians must assist individuals in the act of assisted-dying, and that forcing physicians to 
even refer a patient to another that would assist in PAD would be against that individual’s 
personal rights (p. 9). It may infringe on their own personal beliefs or their freedoms to have 
these beliefs (p. 9).  
With these factors in mind, it is easier to understand the context of how PAD policy has 
been implemented; it also positions the discussion of policy in a way that indicates how many 
aspects are still in the beginning phases and that there are many questions left unanswered. The 
significance of every aspect listed above, among others, plays a key role in the implementation 
of PAD and will hopefully be addressed to create a thoroughly revised edition of the legislation 
that has been put into place.  
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) (2015): The ruling that legalized assisted-dying 
In 2009, Gloria Taylor was diagnosed with ALS. With the prohibitive ban on assisted-dying, 
Taylor could not die on her own terms (Carter v. Canada, para. 12). In 2011, Taylor, Lee Carter 
(daughter of Kay Carter), Hollis Johnson (husband of Lee Carter) and Dr. William Shoichet, 
along with British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA), set in motion a challenge to 
the blanket prohibition on assisted-dying (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 11). This challenge 
argued that all legislation prohibiting an assisted-death (s. 14 & 241 of the Criminal Code) was 
unconstitutional because it violates section 7 and 15(1) of the Charter. The plaintiffs in the 
Carter case made two claims: 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 19 
 (1) that the prohibition on physician-assisted dying deprives competent adults, who 
suffer a grievous and irremediable medical condition that causes the person to endure 
physical or psychological suffering that is intolerable to that person, of their right to life, 
liberty and security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter; and (2) that the prohibition 
deprives adults who are physically disabled of their right to equal treatment under s. 15 of 
the Charter. (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 41.)  
In June 2012, the BC Supreme Court ruled that the assisted-dying prohibition did, in fact, 
violate Gloria Taylor’s section 7 and section 15 rights and she was granted a constitutional 
exemption to receive an assisted death (Carter v. British Columbia, 2012). Justice Smith 
declared that the law was invalid and Parliament would need to enact legislation to fit the ruling. 
Gloria Taylor passed away in October 2012 of natural causes and did not use her constitutional 
exemption of an assisted death (CBC News, 2012). This decision was overturned in 2013 by the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal because of the principle of stare decisis because of the former 
decision Rodriguez (1993) (Carter v. Canada, 2015). The 2013 appeal was appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). The SCC found that the Taylor’s s. 7 rights were being 
violated by s. 241 of the Criminal Code (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 64). Preventing Taylor 
from receiving an assisted-death would contribute greatly to her suffering in the advanced stages 
of her condition and this would cause undue pain and suffering (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 
66). In addition, other Canadian court decisions have addressed the importance of patient 
autonomy, medical decision making and the right to make ‘fundamental life choices’ (Carter v. 
Canada, 2015, para. 67-8); these cases (Nancy B. v. Hôtel-Dieu de Québec, 1992, Ciarlariello v. 
Schacter, 1993, among others) have examined the importance of consent and autonomous 
decision regarding one’s bodily integrity—thus, “it is this same principle that is at work in the 
cases dealing with the right to refuse consent to medical treatment, or to demand that treatment 
be withdrawn or discontinued” (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 67). Taylor was deemed to be a 
competent adult requesting the right to an assisted-death on the basis that she did not wish to live 
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in a state of suffering. As per Canada v. Bedford (2013), the SCC found it to be important to 
determine what the purpose of the original law prohibiting assisted-dying was for, in order to 
protect vulnerable individuals from committing suicide during a weakened state (Carter v. 
Canada, 2015, para. 78). This was necessary to determine whether the prohibition was overbroad 
or grossly disproportionate. Identifying the original purpose of the law was crucial in 
understanding that former landmark decision Rodriguez identify the ‘preservation of life’ 
principle; this principle was deemed in Carter to be a “social value rather than as a description of 
the specific object of the prohibition” (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 76).  
All three parts of s. 7 were engaged in the Carter case: ‘life, liberty and security of the 
person’ because the blanket prohibition impacted each interest. Gloria Taylor’s quality of life 
was impacted by the prohibition and create the possibility that she could take matters into her 
own hands while she was still able to. This would be detrimental to the intended purpose of the 
law, since it was meant to prevent suicide—not create it. Taylor’s liberty was impacted because 
she had the right to make autonomous decisions regarding her person, and not have this taken 
away by the government (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 30); a blanket prohibition on PAD took 
away her liberty because it disallowed her to engage in a dignified death of her choice. Finally, 
Gloria Taylor’s ‘security of the person’ right was engaged from prohibiting PAD because of the 
fact that she could not choose her death, and take care of her person (Carter v. Canada, 2015, 
para. 30).  
The SCC ruled that the prohibitive ban on assisted dying infringed upon s. 7 rights, and 
that these infringements were not in accordance to the principles of fundamental justice (POFJ). 
It was overbroad in having an impact on individuals that do not fall under a vulnerable category. 
It is possible for individuals to be competent, rational and have a disability but still be capable of 
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making a choice to receive a medically assisted death (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 86). 
Moreover, the ban was found to be grossly disproportionate to its original purpose because it 
may cause an individual to suffer unnecessarily. If individuals are not given the right to make the 
autonomous decision to die with dignity, it could cause an individual to take their own life while 
they are still able to—creating the possibility of a premature death (Carter v. Canada, 2015, 
para. 89-90). 
The law was not found to be arbitrary in its nature because it fulfilled its purpose. The 
ban helped to prevent individuals from assisting in suicides, and from individuals receiving 
assisted-deaths, so it did fulfil its duties (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 83-84). In Carter, the 
ruling found that the s. 7 violation of the Charter could not be saved by s. 1 because the violation 
was not in accordance to the POFJ (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 31); under analysis, it was 
found that the law was overbroad since was meant to protect vulnerable populations but it 
impacted more than just those who were intended to be protected. Additionally, it was grossly 
disproportionate, due to the severity of the outcomes (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 31).  
On February 6th, 2015, the SCC ruled that the blanket prohibition on assisted-dying 
violated the s. 7 rights of the Charter, and that s. 241 and 14 of the Criminal Code were not in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Section 15 did not need to be examined 
under the principle of fundamental justice because the law was found to be unconstitutional 
under s. 7 (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 93). The legislation was given a suspended declaration 
of invalidity for a 12-month period (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 147 & Nicol & Tiedemann, 
2016, pp. 3-4).  
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Bill C-14 (2016) Overview: A Legislative Background 
In June of 2016, the Legislative Background: Medical Assistance in Dying (Bill C-14, as 
Assented to on June 17, 2016) was published by the Department of Justice of Canada. This 
Legislative Background on MAID is a compilation of the history of the Act (Bill C-14, 2016) and 
the discussion of concerns and considerations with respect to policies in other countries. This 
legislative background gives in detail an explanation for each section in Bill C-14 (2016). The 
Legislative Background (2016) explains that Bill C-14 (2016) was enacted to: “find a balance 
between the autonomy of those individuals seeking access to medical assistance in dying and the 
interests of vulnerable persons and of society…” (Government of Canada, Legislative 
Background, MAID, 2016, p. 6). Even though Parliament recognized the possibility of impacting 
section 7 and 15 rights of the Charter by including the eligibility criteria that an individual must 
have a natural foreseeable death. This criterion is considered valid by legislators because it 
supposedly recognizes the importance of this balance that they sought to find while 
implementing this bill, and preserving the ‘respect for human life’:   
“[Restricted to Individuals whose Deaths have become Reasonably Foreseeable] approach 
respects autonomy during the passage to death, while otherwise prioritizing respect for 
human life and the equality of all people regardless of illness, disability or age. It also 
furthers the objective of suicide prevention and the protection of the vulnerable. Recognizing 
the complexity of the legal and social issues associated with medical assistance in dying, this 
approach strikes an appropriate balance between the competing rights, interests and values.” 
Moreover, this criterion was meant to be ambiguous—to allow medical practitioners to make 
a discretionary decision for each individual case (Government of Canada, Legislative 
Background, MAID, 2016, p. 21).  
Bill C-14 (2016) Medical Assistance in Dying 
Bill C-14: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other 
Acts (2016) was first introduced to the House of Commons on April 14th, 2016 by the Minister of 
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Justice (Nicol & Tiedemann, 2016, p. 1).  In the Carter v. Canada (2015) ruling, the government 
was given initially given 12 months to draft legislation that would fit the needs of society 
regarding assisted dying. This ended up being 16 months because the federal government filed a 
request for an extension, so the SCC granted an extension to the suspended declaration of 
invalidity (Nicol & Tiedemann, 2016, p. 1). The process of enacting this bill included the 
implementation of three panels to address important issues regarding MAID: The External Panel 
on Options for a Legislative Response to Carter v. Canada, A Provincial-Territorial Expert 
Advisory Group on Physician-Assisted Dying, and the Special Joint Committee on Physician 
Assisted Dying (Nicol & Tiedemann, 2016, pp. 1-2). In drafting the MAID legislation, Quebec’s 
end of life legislation Bill 52: An Act respecting end-of-life care was examined. This 
examination involved addressing common similar issues as those being faced for legalizing 
assisted-dying across Canada. Some of these similarities are related to policy guidelines, rights 
of the patients and of those who are providing the MAID, as well as other issues (Nicol & 
Tiedemann, 2016, p. 3).  
The Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying (the Special Joint Committee) 
was created by the House of Commons and the Senate in December of 2015 (Nicol & 
Tiedemann, 2016). This committee produced the Report of the Special Joint Committee on 
Physician-Assisted Dying in late February of 2016. This report was published just months before 
Bill C-14 (2016) received royal assent and presented 21 expansive recommendations for policy 
makers to consider; three specific recommendations were overlooked that were of importance for 
the rights of Canadians. 
The second recommendation given by the Special Joint Committee “That medical 
assistance in dying be available to individuals with terminal and non-terminal grievous and 
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irremediable medical conditions that cause enduring suffering that is intolerable to the 
individual in the circumstances of his or her condition” (p. 45). This recommendation has been 
overlooked entirely within Bill C-14 (2016), unless an individual’s death is ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ they will not meet the eligibility criteria. Recommendation number three provides 
that “That individuals not be excluded from eligibility for medical assistance in dying based on 
the fact that they have a psychiatric condition” (p. 45). Those with psychiatric conditions are not 
able to access assisted-dying at this time, however, there is an independent review in the works 
that will be published in the near future regarding how requests from mentally ill, mature minors, 
and even advanced requests will be implemented or ignored indefinitely within Canadian policy. 
Recommendation number four recognizes that conditions that cause psychological and/or 
physical suffering should be a criterion, however, current policy does not really factor this in, 
since it mainly ignores the actual suffering part of an individual’s life (ignoring the importance 
of an individual’s quality of life), and frames policy around a ‘foreseeable death.’ Though an 
individual must be facing an irremediable and grievous condition, their death must be imminent, 
so their suffering is arguably disregarded; in plain terms, an individual that is going to die soon, 
that has a terminal illness can make the choice to die a little bit sooner, since they’re going to die 
anyway, but someone that is suffering intolerably, that doesn’t have an expiry death, is not 
allowed the privilege of having that autonomy over their own body. Downie (2016) in Ogilvie 
and Oliphant (2016) argues that terminal illness should not be a requirement within MAID 
policy, since it is a vague concept, “It is arbitrary and it has no moral justification as a barrier to 
access.” (Downie in Ogilvie & Oliphant, 2016 p. 12) 
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A person’s death being ‘reasonably foreseeable’ is merely a safeguard and it is an attempt to 
prevent individuals from ending their life too soon. Preserving the concept of sanctity of life may 
coincide with the laws’ original purpose of protecting those from being forced into an assisted-
death. This safeguard is damaging to society because it leaves out individuals that do not fall 
under this category of a foreseeable death. In addition, imposing this to be an eligibility criteria 
has an impact on many of those terminally ill patients that may be facing a long life full of 
suffering, and so it takes away their autonomy over their own body, their dignity, and impacts 
their quality of life. 
On June 15, 2016, the Bill was passed by a vote of 64-12 and sent back to the House of 
Commons (Tasker, 2016). There were seven amendments proposed including the removal of 
‘reasonably foreseeable’ as a criterion to receive MAID, education on palliative care for those 
requesting MAID, the prevention of an individual being involved in the process/signing if they 
would benefit from a patient receiving MAID  (family member), clarity for death certificates and 
medical practitioners, a two-year deadline for the independent reviews to be completed, and two 
amendments regarding the language used in the Bill (Clerk of the Senate, June 16, 2016, pp. 1-
3).  
By a vote of 44-28, on June 17, 2016, MAID became law. The House accepted some of the 
amendments provided by the Senate, including palliative care information and banning 
beneficiaries from being involved in any MAID processes (MacCharles, 2016). The House did 
not, however, remove the reasonably foreseeable death clause. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau 
stated that there was a necessary balance in the legislation—in doing so it would protect 
vulnerable populations without impacting Charter rights (Smith, 2016). Ultimately, the Senate 
backed down from demanding the removal of the reasonably foreseeable criterion, even though 
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many of the senators felt that keeping the clause in was arguably unconstitutional (Stone & Fine, 
2016). Senator André Pratte said (in an interview) “I am convinced the government is making a 
serious and cruel mistake by taking away the right to medically assisted dying from a group of 
patients…but the government will answer to the people for that error. And hopefully, in the not 
too distant future, the courts will remedy that mistake” (Stone & Fine, 2016).  
This is an interesting point made by Pratte, that he expects the courts will fix the mistake 
made by the government—which in part may be true as to identifying whether the new law is 
constitutional. Bill C-14 (2016)’s enactment is a representation of how policy makers and the 
government view society; they simply do not care if they create a law that will infringe upon the 
rights of many. Or have other political motives that come into play such as cost-effective factors. 
In addition, even if the law is challenged through the courts, it could take years to have a solid 
remedy, in which case if Parliament is forced to create or amend new legislation it could take 
even more time to meet the same prohibition model.  
Bill C-14 (2016) amended the Criminal Code, specifically to sections 14, 227 and 241 
(Bill C-14, 2016 & Criminal Code of Canada, 1985). These changes were implemented to create 
the legal exemption for MAID and to provide security for those physicians providing MAID, the 
pharmacists involved in dispensing the lethal dose, and other medical practitioners that are 
involved in the process to ensure that they are following the standards set out by Bill C-14 
(2016). Bill C-14 (2016) has eligibility criteria and exemptions for those involved in the process. 
These criteria and exemptions are also outlined in section 241.2 (1) and (2) of the Criminal 
Code. Significant criteria to make note of are that individuals must be 18 years or older, 
competent to make decisions and have a ‘grievous and irremediable medical condition’ (p. 5, 
section 241.2 (1) (c)). In addition, individuals requesting MAID must be made aware of the 
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options available to them in Canada, and have made the request for MAID without feeling any 
pressures to do so (pp. 5-6) Bill C-14 (2016) goes on to define what a grievous and irremediable 
medical condition is, and declares that individuals must meet all the criteria to receive MAID.  
Changes to the Criminal Code under section 241.2 (2) as amended by the implementation 
of Bill C-14 (2016) are: 
(a) they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability; 
(b) they are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; 
(c) that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical 
or psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved 
under conditions that they consider acceptable; and 
(d) their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their 
medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the 
specific length of time that they have remaining. (Bill C-14 1st reading 42nd 
parliament 2016) 
Whether these criteria fit the needs of all of society, and whether the intentions of this law (those 
being equal access but still protecting those who may become vulnerable) are in fact being met 
by following these criteria will be examined later throughout this paper. 
Bill C-14 (2016) also provides a list of safeguards and protocols for medical practitioners 
to follow while assessing if a patient meets the criteria of receiving a medically assisted death 
and presents guidelines to help the physician carry out the request. An important part to this 
criteria is that throughout the request process and before the medical assistance, the practitioner 
must remind the individual that they can change their minds at any time and ensure that the 
individual understands this (Bill C-14, 2016, section (3), pp. 6-7). 
Bill C-14 (2016) gives explanations for extenuating circumstances, such as if an 
individual is unable to sign the form themselves (section 4), and there needs to be an independent 
witness during the process of MAID. There are extensive guidelines for an individual’s 
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eligibility to partake in becoming an independent witness (section 5). Bill C-14 (2016) states that 
an independent witness is: 
(5) Any person who is at least 18 years of age and who understands the nature of the 
request for medical assistance in dying may act as an independent witness, except if they 
(a) know or believe that they are a beneficiary under the will of the person making the 
request, or a recipient, in any other way, of a financial or other material benefit resulting 
from that person’s death; 
(b) are an owner or operator of any health care facility at which the person making the 
request is being treated or any facility in which that person resides; 
(c) are directly involved in providing health care services to the person making the 
request; or 
(d) directly provide personal care to the person making the request.  
 
These criteria for independent witness eligibility help to protect individuals requesting MAID 
and serve as a safeguard for those involved. There are also guidelines for the independence 
between independent witnesses (section 6). This is important to recognize because it helps to 
ensure that those involved in the witnessing process are not predisposed to any conflicts of 
interests, and neither are the medical practitioners or nurse practitioners. The medical 
practitioners and independent witnesses must be independent of one another to protect the 
patient’s rights and their well-being.  
There are other requirements set out by Bill C-14 (2016) such as that medical 
practitioners involved must have ‘reasonable knowledge, care and skill’ (section 7). This does 
not necessarily mean that there is specific training and education that must take place to provide 
MAID, but it does mean that individuals must follow guidelines set out by their location’s 
standards or medical codes. Finally, there are consequences if the process of MAID is not up to 
the standards and guidelines that have been laid out in Bill C-14 (2016) and within the Criminal 
Code. Individuals that fail to comply with the laws set forth by s. 241 of the Criminal Code are 
liable to be convicted for their offence and may receive an indictable or summary conviction 
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depending on their offence. Bill C-14 directly states that MAID is not a service that is mandatory 
for all physicians to offer, but for those who do, they will be subjected to the consequences based 
on their failure to comply with the law. The fact that no medical practitioner is forced to 
participate in MAID is significant because it protects the rights of physicians. However, it also is 
related to the issue that institutions are also not forced to offer MAID. This aspect will be 
discussed later in the analysis portion of this paper. 
Independent Review and Bill C-14 (2016) 
Bill C-14 (2016) required the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Health to start an 
independent review within 180 days after Bill C-14 (2016) received Royal Assent. This 
independent review was initiated on December 13, 2016 and will address three of the widely-
discussed elements: mature minors, advanced directives and the mentally ill (Bill C-14, section 
9.1 (1) and (2), p. 13). The independent review “will gather and analyze relevant information and 
evidence on the diverse perspectives and issues surrounding requests for medical assistance in 
dying in these three areas, to facilitate an informed, evidence-based, dialogue among Canadians 
and decision-makers” (Health Canada, 2016, p. 30). The independent review is meant to provide 
recommendations and a report that can further be examined whether these three elements should 
be put into Canadian law regarding MAID and international perspectives will be addressed 
within this review (Health Canada, 2016, p. 30). Finally, this report will be made available for 
the public and for Parliament, and will be completed within two years. The expected publication 
date is December 2018 (Health Canada, 2016, p. 30). 
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Provincial Policies 
The provincial policies and guidelines were derived from a report produced by the 
Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on Physician-Assisted Dying (hereinafter P-T 
Group). This panel created by the federal government was meant to inform the policy and make 
recommendations that would help to implement assisted-dying lawfully throughout Canada 
(Nicol & Tiedemann, 2016, p. 2). This committee was created in August 2015 and did not 
include participation from Quebec because they have their own assisted-dying policy (Nicol & 
Tiedemann, 2016, p. 9). The final report was published and accessible on November 30, 2015. 
The advisory committee came up with 43 recommendations regarding the medical aspects of 
MAID, as well as accessibility, duty of the patient, research, oversight, faith based institutions, 
conscientiously objecting, reporting, assessments and other important aspects of assisted-dying 
(Gibson & Taylor, 2015). Once Bill C-14 (MAID) became law, these standards and guidelines 
regarding MAID were submitted to the Canadian Medical Association (CMA), as well as the 
Federation of Medical Regulatory Authorities of Canada (FMRAC). One of the requirements of 
Bill C-14 (2016) was for the Minister of Health to work with the provinces and territories to 
create regulatory guidelines regarding MAID (Legislative Background: Medical Assistance in 
Dying, 2016). In addition, these guidelines were meant to be consistent across Canada and were 
subject to the core elements of the Canada Health Act (Legislative Background: Medical 
Assistance in Dying, 2016). 
The College of Physicians and Surgeons of each province issued the guidelines and 
standards regarding MAID. Each report was published shortly after Bill C-14 and provides 
detailed information regarding the eligibility criteria to receive assisted-death, and gives a 
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summary of Carter v. Canada (2015) and how a medical practitioner should go about providing 
MAID.  
Process 
The process of receiving MAID is similarly regulated throughout the provinces of Canada, 
some policies being more detailed than others. Throughout the country, a consistent requirement 
for the process of MAID is that there must be two “medical assessors” (College of Physicians 
and Surgeons, British Columbia, 2016, p. 2). These medical assessors provide their assessment 
of a patient, and then depending on their assessment, MAID may be carried out. Medical 
assessors must be a registered nurse or physician to meet the criteria of becoming a medical 
assessor. There are a few other strict criteria for a physician or nurse to become a medical 
assessor. Importantly, medical assessors must be independent of one another, so that there is 
objectivity (College of Physicians and Surgeons, British Columbia, 2016, p. 3). A medical 
assessor is independent if they are:  
a. are not a mentor to the other MA or responsible for supervising their work 
b. do not know or believe that they are a beneficiary under the will of the person making 
the request, or a recipient, in any other way, of a financial or other material benefit 
resulting from that person’s death, other than standard compensation for their services 
relating to the request 
c. do not know or believe that they are connected to the other MA or to the person 
making the request in any other way that would affect their objectivity (Professional 
Standards and Guidelines – Medical Assistance in Dying, British Columbia, June 23, 
2016).  
 Another aspect of the process is that individuals that are requesting MAID must be deemed 
competent and able to give personal consent to such a request. A pharmacist will dispense the 
medication to the physician’s possession in the patient’s name. Patients must be reminded that 
they can rescind their request at any time. Physicians must be present during the entire procedure 
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of administering or transferring the medication to the patient and must not leave the patient until 
they have been pronounced dead (College of Physicians and Surgeons, British Columbia, 2016, 
p. 4). A medical assessor that carries out the MAID must complete a MAID Report of death 
form. This may specifically be sent to each provinces’ Coroner service, or to whichever 
organization that reviews said forms. 
Documentation 
Documentation is created when individuals request MAID and for those individuals who 
are unable to sign said documentation, a competent adult may do so on behalf of the individual 
requesting, so long as they are not benefiting from such a request, and it must be with the request 
of the patient that is unable to sign (College of Physicians and Surgeons, British Columbia, 2016, 
p. 5). This documented request must be witnessed by two independent individuals that are 
competent adults. There are a few criteria that outline whether an individual is an independent 
party. This is important because there are factors that may cause conflicts in such a situation, and 
the criteria that an independent witness must face are righteously put into place to protect those 
who may request MAID, and prevent an individual from receiving MAID in cases where they 
may be coerced into doing so.  
Conscientious Objection 
A conscientious objection may occur where a medical practitioner objects to offering 
MAID for their own personal reasons. This may be because of their own personal beliefs, such as 
a religion or an objection to its morality, or because of some type of conflict of interest—such as 
a personal relationship with the individual. If this is the case, physicians are subjected to the 
Professional Obligations and Human Rights (2008) policy. They are expected to inform their 
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patients of their reasons, and not disregard the patient’s needs; this means that they could assist 
them in finding a physician that is able to assist them in MAID if that is what they choose. They 
are not, however, permitted to disregard the availability or option of MAID. With these factors to 
be taken into consideration, medical practitioners are not being forced to offer MAID in their 
practices. The legislation, and the College of Physicians and Surgeons, does not expect all 
practicing physicians to offer MAID (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2016, p. 
5).  
This concept of conscientious objection provides patients with security, knowing that 
their needs will be heard and assessed, but also provides safeguards for medical practitioners 
who simply do not wish to partake, or who have moral or religious beliefs that may otherwise 
prevent them from offering this end of life assistance. The intent of the policy was to protect all 
parties involved, therefore, conscientious objection provides a useful and practical option, which 
nevertheless helps to ensure that the rights of physicians are not being impinged upon. A concern 
for many medical practitioners as noted by the CMA was that some may be forced to offer 
MAID, so conscientious objection creates a safeguard for medical practitioners. This is a key 
issue in the MAID debate currently because it is having an impact on the accessibility and ease 
of access to MAID for patients wishing to receive it (Dying with Dignity, 2016). No medical 
practitioner is forced to offer MAID, and neither are any medical institutions. This includes 
palliative care units, hospitals, hospices and religious health facilities. This has become an issue 
because an institution’s refusal to offer MAID is creating a barrier for those wishing to access it, 
but also forcing them to seek treatment outside of a facility and causing unnecessary suffering.  
The Federation of Medical Regulatory Authorities of Canada (FMRAC) 
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Another important organization involved in MAID is the Federation of Medical 
Regulatory Authorities of Canada (FMRAC). FMRAC is an organization that helps to encourage 
the collaboration of the members on important medical policy regulation. It also helps to create 
standards and inform parliamentary bodies of important medical issues (FMRAC, 2016). The 
members of FMRAC are the 13 Provincial and being a Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons as 
per whichever province or territory they belong to (FMRAC, 2016). FMRAC policy 
recommendations are founded on eight principles. It is important to recognize these eight 
principles while reviewing the provincial policies and processes regarding MAID, since 
ultimately, if the policies set in place to help guide medical practitioners are not following or in 
accordance to these principles, then it is possible that patient’s rights, or the rights of some 
medical practitioners are being overlooked. If one where to use these eight principles as a guide 
while reviewing provincial policies, one can determine whether these principles are being used 
and applied correctly. Although Bill C-14 (2016) set out eligibility criteria for those who are 
legally allowed to received MAID, and provided definitions (though minimally), it has been left 
up to the provinces to put orders into effect to educate, assist and guide the implementation of 
MAID across Canada. Therefore, these principles are and have been considered in provincially 
documentation. 
The eight principles are:  
1. Respect for patient autonomy—meaning that those who are competent adults can 
make autonomous decisions about their person 
2. equity—meaning that those who wish to receive an assisted death are able to access 
information and access to this right should they meet the criteria 
3.  respect for physician values—meaning that physicians involved may be allowed to 
have their own personal beliefs and must practice without discriminating; as well as 
following their code of ethics 
4. consent and capacity—meaning that the required criteria are met, and voluntary 
consent is given 
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5. clarity—meaning that all methods used by physicians and medical bodies must be 
clear for patients to understand and express the duties of the medical practitioner, 
6. dignity—meaning that everyone involved in the process must be treated with dignity 
7. accountability—meaning that those who are involved must ensure that they are 
capable in conducting assessments and when they are in need of help in difficult 
decisions, that they consult with their superiors 
8.  duty to provide care—meaning that physicians must not abandon their patients and 
must ensure that the patient has another medical practitioner unless they are no longer 
needed, and that they must be helpful and show compassion to their patients 
(FMRAC, Physician-Assisted Dying Guidance Document, 2016, p. 2).    
These principles are representative of the values that FMRAC encourages. This is relevant 
because it illustrates the need for consistent regulatory bodies—and so at least on the surface, 
these eight principles are useful in analyzing Bill C-14 (2016)’s acknowledgement of these 
principles. 
Julia Lamb and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 
Shortly after Bill C-14’s (2016) enactment, Julia Lamb and the British Columbia Civil 
Liberties Association (BCCLA) put in motion a civil claim regarding her case. Julia Lamb 
suffers from a grievous and irremediable medical condition that causes intolerable suffering 
(para. 6-7), but her death is not necessarily reasonably foreseeable, since the condition which she 
suffers from (Spinal Muscular Atrophy, SMA) has varying progress and is classified as a 
‘progressive degenerative disease’. Individuals that suffer from this degenerative disease have a 
lower life expectancy and it is incurable (para. 8-10). Lamb suffers from other health 
complications arising because of her disease, but it does not impact her cognitive abilities (para. 
9). Bill C-14’s (2016) eligibility criteria prevents her from requesting MAID. The remedy that 
this civil claim is seeking is a declaration of invalidity and that Julia Lamb be provided with a 
constitutional exemption when she feels that the state she is living with becomes intolerable (p. 
11). This is on the grounds that her section 15 (1) Charter rights are being infringed upon 
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because the law is discriminatory against her because of her disability and she is not allowed the 
same equal benefit of the law (p. 13). Lamb is arguing that her section 7 Charter rights are being 
infringed upon since Lamb is unable to use MAID to decide to end her life. So, her liberty is 
being infringed upon if she cannot make this autonomous decision because of the law. This law 
is causing her to suffer intolerably and so her fundamental right to security of the person is being 
deprived (Notice of Civil Claim, BCCLA, Lamb, 2016, para 10-12). Because of her condition, 
the civil claim argues that the law prevents individuals that not in the typical age range of a 
person suffering intolerably to receive an assisted death in a lawful way, and prevents those who 
are unable to take their own life. In addition, the civil claim seeks to challenge the constitutional 
validity of section 241 of the Criminal Code because Bill C-14 section 241 (2) part (b) and (d) 
state that an individual meets the criteria to receive an assisted death, only if they are in 
‘irreversible decline’ and ‘their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable’ (p. 3, para. 5).  
 The Attorney General of Canada responded to the BCCLA’s civil claim by stating that 
section 241.2 of the Criminal code is “a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter” (Attorney 
General of Canada, Response to Civil Claim, 2016, p. 9); it responds that the sections provided 
do not infringe upon the Charter rights (section 7 or 15 (1)). The response to the civil claim 
makes note of the importance of suicide prevention and argues that it maintains that stance by 
continuing to follow the laws set out (Response to Civil Claim, Attorney General, p. 8. para. 10). 
It is also argued within this response to the civil claim that the Carter (2015) ruling did not 
“provide a general right to medically assisted death as a response to suffering in life” (Response 
to Civil Claim, Attorney General, 2016, p. 8, para. 9).  
Dying with Dignity Canada 
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 A significant organization that has been involved in the ongoing compilation of research 
and data, as well as advocating for assisted-dying in Canada, is Dying with Dignity Canada 
(DWD). This organization was included within this data because one of the interview 
participants works with DWD. They are a significant organization advocating for MAID and the 
rights of those who wish to receive MAID because they help to educate the public on the rights 
that Canadians currently have, allow individuals to input their concerns about end-of-life options, 
and help to inform individuals where they can reach out for end-of-life options. DWD was 
founded on June 1st, 1980, and is a non-profit organization that advocates for end-of-life options 
such as MAID within Canada. They have also been consulted with on panels, such as the Report 
of the Special Joint Committee on PAD (Ogilvie & Oliphant, 2016). DWD has expressed their 
main concerns and recommendations for policy regarding MAID. These three recommendations 
are: “safeguards should be reasonable but not excessive…non-participating physicians and 
pharmacists must provide effective referrals…patients need to be able to die wherever they live” 
(Dying with Dignity Canada, 2015). These are important aspects of the MAID framework in 
Canada and since Bill C-14 became law in June 2016, two of these concerns have been arguably 
addressed within the legislation. The safeguards for those who are vulnerable can be seen by the 
provincial policies and resources enacted throughout the provinces to ensure that an individual’s 
competence is acceptable is already a part of the framework. Physicians may refuse to help their 
patients in ending their lives through PAD, but they still must support their patient by referring 
them to another physician that does offer MAID. However, the last recommendation is most 
concerning, because across Canada it has been seen that some hospitals and end of life care units 
are refusing assisted-dying within their facilities; this creates a cruel alternative to those wishing 
to access PAD—they must be transferred out of these facilities to have their appointments and 
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the assistance in death (Dying with Dignity Canada, 2016). This is cruel to those who are 
suffering from grievous and terminal illnesses—especially if they meet all the criteria set out by 
Bill C-14. Although Bill C-14 does not force medical practitioners or specific institutions to aid 
in death, it is arguably unjust that if MAID is now law in Canada that individuals are unable to 
access their right in any institution that is funded publicly. Conscientious objection is specific to 
physicians and medical practitioners, but it does not prevent those who do not object to MAID 
from coming to these institutions and helping a patient that has been referred to them, and so 
transferring these individuals for their assessments regarding MAID and the actual act of PAD is 
arguably detrimental to their security of their person, when they already have the right to choose 
to die with dignity. St. Paul’s Hospital located in Vancouver, British Columbia is one facility 
specifically that has refused assisted death on the premises. This has become an accessibility 
issue for those patients requesting MAID (Blackwell, 2016). 
Chapter 3  
Interview Findings & the Implications of Bill C-14 (2016)  
The interview portion of this project helped to supplement the policy analysis. The 
participants were all required to be 18 years or older and involved in the MAID debate already to 
ensure that they were no risks created by their participation in the research. This group was 
targeted because these individuals were not an at-risk population or receiving MAID themselves. 
The sampling method used was purposive, but also turned into a convenience sample because 
participants had to fit the criteria and be able and willing to participate in an interview. These 
interviews were one-on-one and audio recordings were used to ensure accuracy of the 
information and were transcribed after the interview ended.  
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 Semi-structured interviews were the most efficient form of interviews that could be 
conducted in this research to include the knowledgeable opinion of the individual that was 
chosen and willing to participate. Semi-structured interviews allowed for the conversations to 
flow naturally and allowed the direction of the conversation to adapt to new concepts that I did 
not bring up, but, it was still feasible to keep the conversation on topic and directed to the 
concepts that were relevant to this project. The questions I had for participants were asking about 
policy recommendations, how the policy is working in practice, what is vulnerability, and the 
‘reasonably foreseeable’ criteria that Bill C-14 (2016) entails. These questions are important 
because they are not directly resolved in policy or law; they are often open to interpretation and 
so the dialogue that was created in these interviews helped to broaden and inform the research in 
a very rich way. This research was meant to be exploratory, and it did explore new ideas and 
aspects of assisted-dying that I did not foresee. The interviews conducted were one-on-one 
between myself and the research participant; the interviews lasted up to an hour in length and 
were completely voluntary.  
Two interviews were conducted for this research project. These interviews were conducted 
via Skype and telephone. The first interview was with Dr. Ellen Wiebe from the University of 
BC (UBC). Dr. Wiebe is a physician in British Columbia that offers MAID, and is a member of 
the Physicians Advisory Council of Dying with Dignity Canada. Wiebe provided great clarity 
and insight into the process of MAID and some methods of making this process easier. She also 
provided insight to the difficulty of defining vulnerability and determining vulnerability in those 
that are requesting MAID. The second interview conducted was with Cory Ruf, the 
communications coordinator of Dying with Dignity Canada. Ruf illuminated that it is important 
to look at eligibility criteria and safeguards as two separate categories. Ruf noted that under Bill 
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C-14 (2016), individuals that have the capacity to make a request to MAID, but do not have a 
‘reasonably foreseeable’ death are unable to receive MAID, and are forced to endure intolerable 
suffering. Both interviews identified some key issues with Bill C-14 (2016) and aspects of policy 
that still need to be addressed. The key themes from these interviews were identified by 
understanding the direction of both interviews and recognizing the issues that literature already 
produced may not have explored as thoroughly. The key themes identified were: vulnerability, 
recommendations to policy, independent reviews, reasonably foreseeable death and 
understanding safeguards. 
Vulnerability 
A finding that was interesting to this research was that in one physician’s perspective, 
determining whether an individual is vulnerable is not a difficult assessment to make. There are 
factors that must be considered while determining vulnerability, such as if an individual may be 
easily persuaded to request an assisted-death. Dr. Wiebe notes that individuals in a vulnerable 
state are “usually so obvious that you don’t need to [assess them]. But the kind of people who 
ask for assisted deaths tend to be white, rich, well-educated, very much in charge of their lives 
and that’s why they want to be in charge of their deaths” (E. Wiebe, personal interview, February 
7, 2017).  An important aspect of recognizing vulnerability is to understand if an individual can 
give informed consent, and able to understand what their end-of-life options are and make 
informed decisions based on that understanding. There are many psychosocial factors to be 
considered, especially the fact that deeming an individual to be vulnerable, does not necessarily 
mean that an individual cannot give informed consent or request an assisted-death (C. Ruf, 
personal interview, March 13, 2017). This illustrates the fact that vulnerability cannot easily be 
defined, but in terms of medical assistance in dying, it is up to the physician to make that 
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determination to ensure the safety of those requesting end-of-life options. Dr. Wiebe addressed 
the fact that there are individuals living in vulnerable situations, as well as vulnerable 
populations and those that are living with conditions that may arguably make them vulnerable so 
it is important to understand this differentiation and make assessments accordingly (E. Wiebe, 
personal interview, February 7, 2017). Wiebe addresses the questions regarding how to define 
vulnerability by introducing her own interests in vulnerable populations which really illustrates 
the dynamics of vulnerability. Some of the vulnerable populations as determined by various 
criteria that Wiebe makes note of are: Indigenous individuals, those in poverty and individuals 
that are incarcerated. An interesting finding that Dr. Wiebe shared was that many individuals 
living in these vulnerable situations are not thinking about a good death because they are living 
in ‘survival mode’ (E. Wiebe, personal interview, February 7, 2017). These people are 
vulnerable especially, and a question posed by Dr. Wiebe was: would they be considering an 
assisted-death if they were not facing or living in these conditions of vulnerability? (E. Wiebe, 
personal interview, February 7, 2017).  
Ruf explains that those that are considered vulnerable are being “denied choice because 
they’re interpreted as vulnerable. Their agency is taken away from [them] even though they 
satisfy all the criteria. They are suffering intolerably and capable of consenting and 
understanding the consequences of their decision… Bill C-14 [shows] that there are groups that 
are being denied because Parliament is not acknowledging the agency that they have the right 
that they’ve been given and they’re being discriminated against because their death is not 
reasonably foreseeable for example on the basis of their diagnosis” (C. Ruf, personal interview, 
March 13, 2017). 
Recommendations to Policy & Independent Reviews 
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A key finding throughout the interviews was that current policy is not fitting the needs of 
those requesting assisted-dying. Although a portion of these requests are related to advanced 
consent, mature minors and the mentally ill, an important factor that could be addressed before 
the independent reviews are completed is ending the process of transferring patients and making 
end-of-life options such as MAID accessible. There are many individuals suffering because they 
are seeking care in religious health facilities that do not provide MAID. This is a cruel and 
unethical treatment plan by forcing these individuals to transfer somewhere else in their end-of-
life stages of suffering (E. Wiebe, personal interview, February 7, 2017). For assessments to be 
completed for those in publicly funded institutions refusing MAID, an individual may not even 
be aware that they have the option to request MAID. Individuals that are aware, and competent 
enough to make the informed decision, are forced to be transferred out of the institution more 
than once to complete the entire process of the request, assessment and decision making process.  
 Another factor that ties in with transferring patients is that requesting MAID is often a 
time sensitive matter, as some individuals are on the verge of losing their capacity or must 
refrain from taking pain medications to competently make decisions regarding their health. The 
possible delay of a transfer to receive MAID could go against the wishes of the patient if they 
lose their capacity before the transfer. This is related to the advanced consent concerns because if 
there was policy allowing an advanced request, then the wishes of the patient could be fulfilled 
even if they lost their capacity in that short period of time (C. Ruf, personal interview, March 13, 
2017). Ruf notes that “publicly funded institutions are agreeing to transfer patients but in some 
cases the delay deprives them of their choice and the whole process imposes additionally pain 
and uncertainty and is certainly medically unnecessary and in our opinion inhumane” (C. Ruf, 
personal interview, March 13, 2017).  Ultimately, there needs to be a balance between protecting 
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those that lose capacity but also fulfilling their autonomous decisions while they are able—thus, 
allowing a dignified death. Wiebe does not think that advance directives will become law in 
Canada, simply because there is “nowhere in the world can you say when I can no longer make 
decisions for myself I would like to have an assisted death” (E. Wiebe, personal interview, 
February 7, 2017).  
Wiebe notes that that at the most, those who are requesting and receiving an assisted-death in 
Canada are around 5% of the population and so 95% of the others are dying naturally and not 
choosing assisted-dying (E. Wiebe, personal interview, February 7, 2017).   
Reasonably Foreseeable Death 
Dr. Wiebe identified that it is important to understand that it is difficult to predict an 
individual’s death, so it is up to two independent doctors’ assessments and discretion to decide 
whether their natural death is reasonably foreseeable. She also explains that there are varying 
answers when interpreting what ‘reasonably foreseeable’ means and that some physicians like 
herself believe that a few years can be interpreted within that criterion, while others believe that 
it must be within a couple of weeks, or even months. Ruf explains that it is questionable whether 
the reasonably foreseeable criteria complies with the Carter ruling and that “how reasonably 
foreseeable is interpreted… [could impact] someone with an excruciating chronic illness who 
could live for years or more than a decade in this condition of intolerable suffering…has the 
capacity to make that particular decision” (C. Ruf, personal interview, March 13, 2017).  
It became apparent within the interviews that this criterion is being navigated on a case by 
case basis, based on varying factors such as life expectancy of the patient with their disease, and 
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their age as based on the life-expectancy of the average man or woman (E. Wiebe, personal 
interview, February 7, 2017).  
Understanding Safeguards 
Physicians offering MAID such as Dr. Ellen Wiebe believe that Bill C-14 (2016) is a 
good one because it requires a “careful, thoughtful process” as well as a lot of time and energy 
(E. Wiebe, personal interview, February 7, 2017). Safeguards include 14 pages of forms that 
must be completed for each individual patient. There is also a mentoring process for those 
medical practitioners wishing to offer MAID. Cory Ruf of Dying with Dignity Canada explains 
that it is important to look at eligibility criteria and safeguards as two separate categories. He 
states that “we tend to link the safeguards and eligibility as the same thing [and] that there are 
ways that the eligibility serves as safeguards.” He explains that Bill C-14 (2016) controls who 
can access MAID by the eligibility criteria but also by using the safeguards such as two 
independent health care professionals being involved to evaluate a patient (C. Ruf, personal 
interview, March 13, 2017). An interesting factor related to this is that mature minors are left out 
of policy, simply because of their age. However, mature minors that have met the age of majority 
in most of the provincial territorial jurisdictions in Canada are able to make health decisions on 
their own and so this safeguard disallowing mature minors to request an assisted-death is 
arguably discriminatory (C. Ruf, personal interview, March 13, 2017). 
These two perspectives are unique because they differ in opinions on the policy. Dr. 
Wiebe agrees that the policy could be better and noted that the documentation process is lengthy 
but that it ensures that the patients accessing MAID qualify under the law (E. Wiebe, personal 
interview, February 7, 2017). However, Dr. Wiebe thinks that “Canadians in general can be 
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reassured that it’s a very good process” (E. Wiebe, personal interview, February 7, 2017). The 
important thing to take from this is that medical practitioners are doing their job to the best of 
their ability with the policy that they have been provided with. The issues with the policy are not 
in the application of MAID but in the policy, itself; Wiebe makes note of this with the 
recommendation of transferring patients (E. Wiebe, personal interview, February 7, 2017). Dr. 
Wiebe explains that Canadians need not worry about the process because the medical 
practitioners involved in MAID are doing the best they can to ensure that those who may be 
vulnerable are assessed individually and accordingly so that they are protected from being 
coerced to ending their lives. On the other hand, Cory Ruf makes note that though Bill C-14 
(2016) did legalize assisted-dying, it does so “more conservatively, and more limited than those 
outlined in Carter v. Canada (2015) decision so those individuals that would have had access 
under the Carter decision now found that the right has been taken away from them under Bill C-
14 (2016)” (C. Ruf, personal interview, March 13, 2017). This comment illustrates the main 
issue with assisted-dying policy in Canada because the Carter decision allowed competent adults 
to request MAID, but Bill C-14 (2016) takes away this right and limits it to those who fit the 
criteria that they must be in irreversible decline, and that they have a natural foreseeable death. It 
is shown in both perspectives that there is a need for a balance of allowing access to MAID but 
also protecting individuals from falling vulnerable to this policy.   
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Chapter 4  
Literature Review 
This literature review seeks to examine and connect literature from perspectives that are 
useful in examining policy in Canada that are related to assisted-dying. After this discussion, the 
literature review will explain what disability studies are and what the three paradigms within it 
are useful for, and how disability studies are significant. The approaches used are the 
vulnerability theory and the capabilities approach. These theoretical frameworks are useful in 
positioning where there are gaps in the literature, as well as where policy may be arguably 
damaging to many Canadians. It is important to examine these perspectives since assisted-dying 
legislation is not accessible to those who are vulnerable within society, and this review seeks to 
explore the concept of vulnerability and disability to help inform the discussion. Nevertheless, 
the purpose of the laws on assisted-dying is consistent with the theme that they have strict 
guidelines to protect the vulnerable, therefore, the benefits of examining this literature will be 
that the perspectives examined will help to inform the assisted-dying debate and hopefully be a 
guide to explain why it is necessary for there to be a balance between vulnerability and 
accessibility within Canadian policy.  
While it is important to understand the legal aspect of the policy and decision behind the 
legalization of assisted-dying, it is also necessary to examine some theories that may be relevant 
and useful in making policy become applicable to society and accessible to all. The examination 
of vulnerability and disability are crucial to explain so that these individuals can have equal 
rights and to inform policy makers that there are ways in which the policy currently implemented 
overlooks those who may be suffering grievously but whose death is not imminent. Some 
important terminology to be familiar with for the following sections are disability and 
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impairment. Although there is not strictly one correct term for either of these words, the terms 
used for this particular literature review are as follows: a disability is defined as “any restriction 
or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within 
the range considered normal for a human being” (United Nations, in Wendell 1989, in Davis, 
2006, p. 244). While impairment is defined as: “any loss or abnormality of psychological, 
physiological, or anatomical structure or function” (United Nations, in Wendell 1989, in Davis, 
2006, p. 244).  
Vulnerability and Capabilities: Approaches used within Disability Studies 
Vulnerability is argued by Martha Fineman (2010) to be an inescapable part of living and 
impacts some populations more so than others. However, vulnerability is not harmful to society 
because society’s foundation and perspective of vulnerability is what is harmful to individuals 
facing vulnerability. Vulnerability does not just affect one single group such as a race or 
ethnicity—it plays a role in each member of society’s day to day life, and it may eventually 
impact an individual more so than they are accustomed to. Lid (2015) notes that “one obvious 
tension in discussing vulnerability and disability together is that people with disabilities have 
been treated as containers of vulnerability” (p. 1563). Vulnerability theory and disability studies 
are useful within this literature review because they help to explain the aspects of society that can 
be inquired upon, seeking out an understanding of those facing vulnerability, disability, 
impairments---and the importance of dignity and autonomy. For example, an individual may be 
able to live their life for years on end without any physical pain, until one day they begin to 
realize they are suffering from pains that continually worsen, thus becoming vulnerable because 
of their pain. They are unable to do the things that they used to do before they felt the pain 
originally. The pain that they are feeling is ingrained in their life and becomes a vulnerability—
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one that may be fixed with certain pain medications or treatments, but never gone fully, except 
until death. Frazee (2003) illuminates this further by addressing the fact that those with 
disabilities may feel excluded in everyday circumstances, since their impairment makes it 
difficult to access certain parts of life without special adaptations to their surroundings (p. 260). 
Since individuals with disabilities face discriminatory aspects of life and are therefore excluded 
from opportunities that an able-bodied person would otherwise access, it makes disability studies 
and the lived experiences of disabled persons especially important to analyze because it could 
help to frame the future of inclusive policies (Lid, 2015, p. 1555). Additionally, the Society for 
Disability Studies (1993) explains that: 
“disability studies [seeks] to disentangle impairments from myth, ideology, and stigma 
that influence social interaction and social policy…[and] seeks to uproot the idea that 
economic and social statuses and the assigned roles of [disabled people] are inevitable 
outcomes of their [impairments]” (Linton et al. 1994, in Frazee, 2003, p. 258).  
Couser (2005) positions disability as a concept that creates many ethical considerations 
because individuals that are disabled become vulnerable when the individuality of disability is 
removed (p. 20). This means that when one individual is representing a group in its entirety, it 
can contribute to a distortion to what these individuals may need (p. 20). When disabled persons 
advocate for themselves, Couser (2005) states that they become less vulnerable because they are 
influencing how others perceive them by helping to create awareness about their conditions, and 
how they live and fit into society (p. 20).  
Although it can be beneficial for advocates to be those who self-identify with disability, 
using only one individual as a representative takes away from many individual perspectives. 
Still, the possibility of a disabled person to become involuntarily represented is high, because 
there are many different advocacy groups for different disabilities. Therefore they can be 
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misrepresented, since these individuals leading these groups may not be generalizable to all of 
those who are being represented (Couser, 2005, p. 21). Furthermore, this is an ethical 
consideration to be contemplated while examining disability and policy, and Couser (2005) 
poses the question perfectly: “How can we guarantee or at least try to ensure, that representation 
serves the best interests of vulnerable subjects generally?” (p. 21). Law and policy has previously 
used ‘blanket prohibition’ techniques to guarantee just that. In terms of PAD policy, this was 
certainly the case for the ban of assisted-dying, since it did not allow for any one individual to 
fall vulnerable to the possibility of being misrepresented.  
Moreover, disabled persons could be considered to be ‘vulnerable bodies’ since under some 
circumstances they may be unable to give consent to specific aspects of life and while 
considering assisted-dying laws, it is important to understand that the prohibition’s intention was 
to protect vulnerable people from receiving PAD without consent. Couser (2005) contrasts the 
terms impairment and disability by explaining that disabilities are the reaction to an impairment, 
an impairment being a function of the body that is anomalous, such as being deaf, blind, or 
paralyzed—or to have a deficit of the mind (p. 26); moreover, the reaction to any impairment is 
socially constructed and can nevertheless create tensions between the able-bodied and the dis-
abled bodied (p. 26).  
Disability Studies 
According to Couser (2005) there are three paradigms within disability studies. Couser 
labels them as: symbolic paradigm, medical paradigm and the social paradigm (p. 22). These 
three paradigms are significant to disability studies because they can be applied to the question 
of how to represent disabled persons. The symbolic paradigm “makes a particular trait…the 
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master status…reducing their complex humanity into a single dimension. In representing one 
such individual, it characterizes them all” (Couser, 2005, p. 23) The medical paradigm seeks to 
explain that disability is meant to be removed by medical treatment, to move away from anything 
other than ordinary. But, it also theoretically takes away an individual’s disability by fixing it, so 
then it is removing their ownership of their disability. This means that an individual with an 
abnormality is not responsible for it (Couser, 2005, p. 24).  The social paradigm is a combination 
of the previous two, but also adds to them; it does so by recognizing that disability is a socially 
constructed concept. Couser (2005) argues that disabled persons are ‘disempowered’ (p. 26) and 
so it “places the burden on society to accommodate anomalous bodies” (Couser, 2005, p. 26). 
The social paradigm can help disabled persons because it is useful for advocacy attempts (p. 26), 
meaning that more recognition to the experiences of disabled persons is impacted by the social 
construction (p. 26). Moreover, how disabled individuals are treated is the result of the social 
construction, in which case it is arguably exclusionary and creates unnecessary limitations to 
their lives and it ultimately seeks to marginalize and oppress those who are disabled (Couser, 
2005, p. 26). For policy, Couser’s (2005) argument that disability needs to be better understood 
to ‘acknowledge’ and ‘accommodate’ the needs of those who are impaired (p. 28), and so he 
suggests that by using the social paradigm in disability studies, it can help to create a positive 
representation of disabled groups and dismember the normalcy of society that predisposes the 
disabled to become vulnerable bodies (Couser, 2005, p. 28). This is a useful paradigm to use 
while examining law and policy on assisted-dying since the next step could be making PAD 
accessible to those with disabilities that do not meet the current criteria.  
The next few sections will focus on addressing key points of Martha Fineman’s 
Vulnerability Theory and address some limitations and analyses of the theory; in addition, it will 
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explore how vulnerability may impact a variety of different groups within society. The 
importance of understanding these views on vulnerability specifically will impact the outlook on 
vulnerable states and access to end of life care, such as physician-assisted dying (PAD). 
Moreover, equality, autonomy, and dignity are all key factors in determining and understanding 
what it means to be vulnerable (Lid, 2015, p. 1558). This is important to address since the 
examination of these constructs may be helpful in order to analyze that individuals that are 
vulnerable may have trouble gaining access to rights, and as some who are in vulnerable states 
may feel that it is “…the most basic of all rights, namely [is] the right to have rights” (Lid, 2015, 
p. 1561); in other words, their inability to access the right to have rights may seem as inescapable 
as their vulnerability itself, and it is important that there are individuals that seek to advocate and 
protect those who self-identify as vulnerable. 
Understanding Fineman’s Vulnerability Theory 
To begin, Fineman (2010) explains that the current way of approaching universal 
inequalities is setting specific groups against each other (p. 253), and that the subject of 
vulnerability is embodied within human rights movements (p. 255). In addition, Fineman (2010) 
takes the position that the government should be more responsive and receptive to the 
‘vulnerable subjects’ of society, and that by doing so, it will create awareness for those facing 
inequalities (p. 274).  Moreover, she argues that though self-determination is an important 
element that individuals should strive for, autonomous decision making in a society that is 
unresponsive is simply not possible (Fineman, 2010, p. 260). Fineman (2010) critiques the 
concept of liberalism, because she does not believe that it is applicable to ‘vulnerable subjects’ 
and that liberalism has socially constructed what equality is, and how it can be visible within 
society (p. 262). She explains that “competence is assumed and differences in power, 
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circumstances, or actual ability are ignored. Thus constructed, this ‘liberal subject’ is at the heart 
of political and legal thought” (Fineman, 2010, p. 263). This argument lays the groundwork to 
understanding that society is built on a system that is acknowledging many vulnerable groups 
without responding to their state of vulnerability (p. 255-56). Additionally, this means that 
society’s leaders and government organizations will need to be held accountable, to protect and 
include all the individuals that are living a vulnerable life (p. 256). In recognizing these key 
aspects of Fineman’s (2010) argument, it is important to rationalize who it is that is actually 
vulnerable, or living in a state of vulnerability and how society can address and be inclusive for 
those who are deemed ‘vulnerable.’  Fineman (2010) explains that “the term vulnerable 
population has an air of victimhood, deprivation, dependency or pathology attached to it” (p. 
266) and this is likely what developed her four elements to approach vulnerability.  
In Fineman’s The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State (2010), she provides four 
elements to understand her approach on vulnerability; these are framed and shortened by Cooper 
(2015), who presents them as: “universality, constancy, complexity, and particularity” (p. 1357). 
These components of vulnerability ultimately argued by Fineman (2010) mean that individuals 
among society will always face vulnerability, and that we cannot eliminate it entirely (p. 269), 
instead we must accept those who are facing vulnerabilities and expose the institutions and 
governments that are simply not being inclusive of those who are considered to be vulnerable. 
Again, it especially important to those who are vulnerable. 
  Fineman (2010) argues that equality is hard to accomplish when there is an abundance of 
individuals facing injustices, without the ability to access the same resources as many others 
within society; the “government is unresponsive to those who are disadvantaged, blaming 
individuals for their situation and ignoring the inequities woven into the systems in which we all 
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mired” (Fineman, 2010, p. 257). Moreover, an assumption that can be made is that equality and 
autonomy are connected, since there cannot be a real equality of humanity if autonomy is only 
possible for some parts of society (p. 256 & 259).  This means that some parts of the population 
may be able to access services freely, without issues, so they see equality and are subjected to it; 
however, others that may be facing a more disadvantaged lifestyle may not be able to gain access 
to some services, so they are not being treated equally—thus not able to live an autonomous life. 
Ultimately, Fineman (2010) is arguing that vulnerability is an aspect of life that we may all 
experience (Fineman, 2010, p. 268; Cooper, 2015, p. 1357). This begins the unravelling of the 
universality of vulnerability, and how it can impact every person individually—directly or 
indirectly. This universality could be interpreted as linked to the drive for equality, since it seems 
that Fineman (2010) is attempting to connect the two and make vulnerability be applicable to 
everyone (Cooper, 2015, p. 1357); there are connections here to autonomy too, since those 
individuals who are facing disadvantages are less likely to be able to control and hold their own 
autonomy and thus fall vulnerable to society’s foundation of inequalities and injustices—forcing 
them to become dependent on the systems that are failing them to begin with (Fineman, 2010, p. 
258). This is arguably related to the need for equality, and it is unlikely that society will be 
provided with equal opportunities, so it is even more doubtful that all individuals within society 
will succeed in achieving autonomy.    
The second element of Fineman’s (2010) vulnerability theory is constancy, which frames 
society as individuals that are dependent on one another (Cooper, 2015, p. 1358). Fineman 
(2010) critically notes that vulnerability is constant because there is a “constant possibility of 
harm” (Cooper, 2015, p. 1358); therefore, dependency is a part of vulnerability, since if we are 
constantly vulnerable or subject to being harmed, we are arguably dependent on our relationships 
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and on society to protect us from said harms (Cooper, 2015, p. 1358). There are two kinds of 
dependencies that Fineman (2010) concludes to be crucial in understanding vulnerability: 
inevitable and derivative (p. 263-4); inevitable is simply put, that in a lifetime, an individual 
must depend on another human being—no matter what. One may grow out of inevitable 
dependency, but, eventually may become vulnerable to factors of life. It is experienced by all, in 
one way or another (Fineman, 2010, p. 264). Inevitable dependency appears to be deemed as a 
factor of life, and there is no way to avoid it. The other form of dependency that Fineman (2010) 
speaks to is derivative dependency; this is explained as a social construction of dependency—for 
example, being dependent on a parent because we have been subjected to the social construction 
that individuals are dependents of their parents or their family in a traditional way (p. 264). 
Derivative dependency seems to be another naturally occurring dependency that could possibly 
turn into a problem for vulnerable individuals since they may be troubled by becoming a burden 
to their family or their caregivers. A trend here is that both forms of dependency do not really 
help to locate vulnerability; instead it seems that vulnerability is being rationalized by the two 
kinds of dependency. However, it is important to differentiate the two kinds of dependency that 
Fineman (2010) has marked, since, it is arguable that we would not be able to navigate different 
aspects of vulnerability, especially since derivative dependency seems to overlap with autonomy. 
These two points seem to be connected, since derivative dependency appears to be a rational 
choice—one that has been accepted by individuals to follow through with being a dependent or 
being depended on; moreover, this is, in a sense a self-governing decision, since the individual 
that is being depended on is likely in this position because of the socially constructed foundation 
of traditional roles.  
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The third element to Fineman’s (2010) vulnerability theory is that of complexity. 
Vulnerability is complex since one can be vulnerable in many different ways, sometimes with an 
overlap of different factors that may make an individual vulnerable. In addition to this, 
vulnerability can cause harms in a physical and emotional way—directly and indirectly. Direct 
vulnerability could impact the self, and indirect vulnerability could be an impact or harm that 
causes negative effects to those things surrounding one’s life, such as personal relationships 
(Cooper, 2015, p. 1358). Moreover, these harms could impact individuals through institutions, 
since there are groups and individuals that may be subjected to being harmed because of their 
vulnerability. This element of vulnerability is most applicable to concerns surrounding debates 
regarding physician-assisted dying, since it acknowledges that there may not be easy answers or 
a one size fits all model.  
The fourth and final element of vulnerability theory is particularity—meaning that each 
person may face vulnerability in a different ‘particular’ way, and that ultimately, vulnerability is 
‘uniquely experienced’ (Fineman, 2010, p. 269). Fineman (2010) argues that particularity is a 
crucial aspect of vulnerability theory because a person is individually and institutionally 
positioned, therefore, in both aspects an assessment needs to be made on whether the harms that 
are forced upon a person because of their vulnerability can be reduced (Fineman, 2010, p. 269). 
An assessment of how individuals are institutionally positioned could mean recognizing whether 
they can access the rights and services that they need. If an individual is able to access the 
resources that they need, it can benefit their well-being; this is important to maintain living a 
vulnerable life, rather than defeating it entirely (Fineman, 2010, p. 269). This is related to the 
physician-assisted dying debate, since it is a representation of how important it is to respond to 
and be aware of the differences in vulnerability and it is possible that limitations should be 
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thoroughly examined and established to protect those who can maintain their vulnerable life 
through alternatives to aiding an individual in ending their life.  
Particularity is important to the vulnerability theory, especially since it holds together the 
other three elements: universality, constancy, and complexity; it provides that though 
vulnerability is universally happening—to everyone in one way or another, and that though it is 
constant and unsurmountable, complex and multifaceted—it adds finally that vulnerability is still 
experienced individually, and that it impacts ones’ life in a personal way. That is not to say that 
two people may not be facing the same vulnerability—or living it at the exact same time, but it is 
arguing that everyone may face it differently—depending on their own dependency, access to 
resources, and success in autonomy.   
These four factors of vulnerability help to direct how to label individuals as vulnerable, 
and to understand how and when an individual develop into a vulnerable state. Besides the fact 
that Fineman’s (2010) vulnerability theory addresses a lot of key aspects to vulnerability, 
deeming vulnerability in the simplest of terms to be the result of a natural disaster and a feature 
of life (Fineman, 2010) takes away from the connections to disability and the fact that 
vulnerability and disability are seen as inter-related in the literature.  
In Fineman’s (2010) words, she states that “one of the most troubling aspects of the 
identity approach to equality is that it narrowly focuses equality claims and takes only a limited 
view of what should constitute governmental responsibility in regard to social justice issues” (p. 
254) Additionally, a concern is that society is structured in a way that focuses more on the 
majority of the population and not those who are not defined within it (Fineman, 2010, p. 274). 
Fineman (2010) suggests a need for societal institutions to adapt to fit the needs of those who are 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 57 
being treated unequally; this is arguably possible if the state redistributes wealth towards 
structuring institutions and laws to include those who are vulnerable (p. 274). “By adjusting 
unjust distribution of privilege and opportunity across society would also contribute to a more 
robust democracy and greater public participation” (Fineman, 2010, p. 274); this ties in with 
disability studies, since there is an assumption that most are able-bodied persons, so, those who 
are disabled are overlooked within: “architectural plans, policy initiatives, strategic objectives, 
organizational structures, systems, budgets, laws, and decisions…[and are simply] not taken into 
account” (Frazee, 2003, p. 259). This leads to the next section of the literature review, that will 
examine and relate Fineman’s (2010) Vulnerability Theory to Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
and to a further analysis of how these concepts fit together.  
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Theory 
Martha Nussbaum’s (2006) capabilities approach is based on ten human capabilities—or 
what they should be; she argues that if these are not reachable in the most basic of terms, that the 
lack of these capabilities does not amount to “a life worthy of human dignity” (Nussbaum, 2006, 
p. 78). These ten fundamental capabilities are listed as: life, being able to life a life in a way that 
is arguably worth living (p. 76); bodily health, having good health (p. 76); bodily integrity, 
meaning that an individual has the ability to be mobile and protect themselves from physical  
harm, as well as opportunities to seek out and follow through with human relationships (p. 76); 
‘senses, imagination and thought’, being able to use these senses rationally and by one’s own 
free will (p. 76); Emotions, feeling emotions—good or bad and not being told or taught how to 
feel (p. 77); Affiliation, part one is being able to have freedoms to live among others and have a 
social identity, part two is being able to live a life without discrimination, and have self-worth 
and self-respect (p. 77); Other species—meaning that one can choose to live and appreciate the 
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world (p. 77); Play, meaning that an individual can partake in fun activities (p. 76); finally, 
‘Control over ones environment’, part one meaning that an individual has the right to choose 
their own identity in a political sense, and part two being material, as an individual being able to 
have their own belongings or property, to seek out employment and being treated with the same 
freedom and equality as those around them (p. 77-78).  
 The ten capabilities that should be present in an individual’s life in order to deem their 
life worthy of living (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 78), are important to address when examining 
disability and vulnerability literature, and how they connect If an individual feels that they are 
deemed vulnerable or disabled in a way that they cannot correct or be corrected through 
institutions or other resources within society it would be important because by being responsive 
enough to allow individuals the right to their own autonomy, and for their own lived experiences 
to be evaluated by their own idea of where they fall under capabilities—it would create for a 
much more dignified life, of equal opportunities, and autonomous state. Furthermore, these ten 
capabilities are often taken for granted by those who are not missing any of them, and this can be 
seen in how legislation surrounding those who are facing disabilities or suffering from a form of 
vulnerability is implemented and ‘framed’ (Frazee, 2003, p. 260). Moreover, these individuals 
that are making judgements and passing laws that impact a vulnerable person’s life, are likely not 
facing such impairments themselves and this is a very visible component and shortcoming of 
society’s responsivity to vulnerable populations.  
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Further Analysis 
Kaul (2013) argues that disability is connected to the universality of vulnerability, and 
that disability as a function (p. 94) is difficult to label, since, the capability of an individual’s 
disability is experienced in a personal way, and thus could fall into the possibility of becoming 
‘de-legitimized’ (p. 94), since society is not experiencing this one individual’s ability to access 
rights. However, it is not realistic to assume that all individuals that are facing disabilities are 
helpless or that they are not living up to what is deemed to be a ‘quality-life’ (Lid, 2015, 1561); 
in fact, it is more likely that those individuals who are disabled are more likely to want to be 
included and have equal opportunities to reach the resources in life that they need—to make their 
life experience as satisfactory as it can be (Lid, 2015, 1561). Nonetheless, Lid (2015) argues that 
the capabilities approach interconnected to vulnerability theory and that by connecting the two 
(p. 1563), we can separate and reframe the approaches that individuals are necessarily 
‘vulnerable or invulnerable’ (p. 1563). This ties in with Butler (2014), since she recognizes the 
assumption that vulnerability or disability may only be a part of one’s life for a short period of 
time—or at least that his how it is portrayed (p. 115) Lid (2015) critiques Fineman’s 
understanding of the universality component and illustrates that “we need a concept of the 
human that emphasizes vulnerability as a fundamental human condition. The experience of 
vulnerability changes, but not vulnerability as a basic condition” (Lid, 2015, p. 1564). To 
examine this further, Fineman (2010) indicates that assessing vulnerability can be useful in 
unravelling disability or terminal illnesses and that by doing so, we can move forward in 
addressing public policy and law (Lid, 2015, p. 1559; Fineman, 2010, p. 269). Furthermore, 
vulnerability plays a key role in policy inquiries, since some groups demand protections due to 
their vulnerabilities (Butler, 2014, p.111); Butler (2014) insists that some vulnerable groups are 
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targeted because of their vulnerabilities and thus it poses an interesting dynamic for laws and 
legislation, since, ultimately if certain groups that are vulnerable or disabled may be targeted, it 
is up to government institutions to protect them from harm (p. 111). Although these protections 
need to be examined further, since equal opportunity to accessible rights and autonomy should 
still be the main goal for all the population. when in many cases, an individual has likely had to 
adapt to their disability, or accepted their vulnerability and let go of the incapability to do the 
things that they were once able to do.  It appears that this is what Butler (2014) is trying to reach 
at, by outlining that there are different ways of being vulnerable, and that the term alone may be 
too broad on its own.  
In addition, the connection that Nussbaum (2006) makes between dignity and 
vulnerability is that individuals are likely to face dependency and so by creating a discussion 
around dignity and vulnerability, it provides challenges to rights, citizenship, ethical and political 
attitudes (Lid, 2015, p. 1558; Nussbaum, 2006, p. 160). Furthermore, the capabilities that 
Nussbaum (2006) thoroughly explains, can be extremely useful in identifying the overlap 
between the capabilities approach and Fineman’s (2010) vulnerability theory, since both argue 
that dependency is universal for humanity (Lid, 2015, p. 1557).  
 Other factors that contribute to the challenges that both vulnerability and disability face 
are that since society is not yet completely accessible to these groups; a key theme within these 
perspectives is the illustration that though accessibility is arguably a civil right, it does not mean 
that there are going to be changes to the way that policy is implemented, or even to the way that 
society is built upon (Wendell, 1996, p. 66). Furthermore, the notion that helping those who are 
facing disabilities is simply charity work, makes the process of widespread adaptation to fit all 
the needs of society a difficult task (Wendell, 1996). A related aspect is the consideration that 
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“much disability policy and practice assumes that disability must have enormous economic 
disadvantages, or else large numbers of people will want to be, or to pretend to be, disabled…” 
(Wendell, 1996, p. 64); this is a significant point that Wendell (1996) addresses, because the 
misconception that individuals seek out the disadvantaged lifestyle of being disabled is 
incredulous. A theme emerging from the literature is that it is quite clear that those who are 
deemed disabled and vulnerable do not wish to be treated differently—they would rather receive 
equal treatment, but are unable since they must adapt to the social barriers because society has no 
idea what it really is to be disabled (Frazee, 2003).  
Wendell (1989) argues that the existence of a theory of disability is crucial in 
understanding disability because she argues that it is a social constructed mechanism (Wendell, 
1989, in Davis, 2006, p. 243); furthermore, she argues that disability theories would likely be 
useful to take on a feminist perspective because these perspectives are already familiar with 
inequality arguments and that there is an abundance of disabled women involved in the feminist 
movement (in Davis, p. 243), and this argument is illustrated by scholars within this literature 
review such as Butler and Frazee.  In addition, Wendell (1989) states that “disabled people share 
positions of social oppression that separate us from the able-bodied” (in Davis, 2006, p. 252), so, 
using a feminist paradigm would help to build disability studies further and contradict the what is 
considered to be normal (p. 252). 
 Garland-Thomson (2003) expands on Wendell’s (1989) argument, stating that expansion 
of feminist perspectives into disability studies will help both paradigms, and that ultimately this 
is useful for all ‘the sociopolitical world’ (Garland Thomson, 2003, in Davis, 2006, p. 271); 
moreover, there are a surplus of individuals within society being deemed disabled now, since, 
they are no longer meeting the criteria of what is ‘normal’ (Wendell, 1989, in Davis, 2006, p. 
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246). Wendell (1989) refers to disabled persons as the ‘other’ because of the distinct 
differentiations between them and what is normal. She argues that even if you are one of the 
‘other’ your experiences will be “invalidated…[because] other people are the authorities on the 
reality of the experiences of your body” (Wendell, 1989, in Davis, 2006, p. 252); this is 
significant because this argument is basically representing the treatment of those who are 
deemed disabled and illuminating the fact that many of the policies, laws, and societal 
institutions/government decisions are based on the ‘normal’ person’s perspective, and this is a 
detriment to disabled society, since their voices are not being heard equally, and, their needs are 
not being met—so, they are facing discriminatory institutions. This is an interesting perspective 
that Wendell (1989) brings to the forefront of what disabled persons are referred to, since earlier 
on in this literature review two definitions were provided for disabled, and impairment. The term 
for disabled previously stated was used by the United Nations and examined in Wendell’s (1989) 
paper, so, it is representative of the fact that this concept of ‘normalcy’ has been around for a 
long time, and it shows that equality for disabled individuals is still not where it should be.  
With all of these aspects in mind, it is apparent that there is much discussion on the 
importance of disability studies and these approaches within them; it is important to realize that 
the system is failing and it is crucial to accept that there are parts of society facing inequalities, 
lacking liberties, and so, it is necessary to evaluate these perspectives to make amendments to 
society, rather than forcing individuals to adapt their own living conditions. 
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Chapter 5 
Analysis: Bill C-14(2016) and the Charter 
Assisted-dying policy in Canada is failing those who wish to receive medical assistance. 
When Bill C-14 (2016) was passed with amendments, there was a chance to make changes to the 
policy that would have helped make MAID an accessible, feasible option for those that are 
suffering intolerably. The objective of the prohibition on assisted-dying was to protect the 
vulnerable (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 86), and the Carter decision explained that that a 
blanket prohibition did not just protect the vulnerable but “sweeps conduct into its ambit that is 
unrelated to the law’s objective” (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 86). This is important to take 
note of because there are similarities between the blanket prohibition and Bill C-14 (2016). 
Nowhere in the Carter ruling does it state that a ‘reasonably foreseeable’ death is a mandatory 
requirement for PAD. Unfortunately, the suggested removal of the ‘reasonably foreseeable 
death’ criterion was ignored and the policy became law. The majority Liberal government 
refused to back down by allowing amendments to remove the reasonably foreseeable clause 
(Throap, 2016). Bill C-14 (2016) does not balance the need to protect society and at the same 
time act as an accessible and equal option for those whom may be requesting it. Bill C-14 (2016) 
is unconstitutional because it still impacts those that are competent individuals who cannot 
consent to PAD. This is due to the fact that their deaths may not be reasonably foreseeable even 
though they still meet the other criteria set out by the policy. There is little difference between a 
complete ban on assisted-dying and only allowing individuals that are inevitably going to die. 
This is a loaded term, since every single person will eventually die, but Bill C-14 (2016) requires 
those requesting MAID to have a looming death.  
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This analysis will explain that the Bill C-14 (2016) is unconstitutional because it is not in 
line with the Carter decision. Bill C-14 (2016) has several shortcomings and this analysis will 
unpack these shortcomings by explaining how it is unconstitutional, and the populations 
specifically that it is failing.  Bill C-14 (2016) is in violation of the Charter and is not in 
accordance with the Principles of Fundamental Justice (POFJ) as found in section 7 of the 
Charter.  the analysis will also show how the Bill is just a revised version of the assisted-dying 
prohibition in the Rodriguez era. The chapter will conclude with recommendations on how to fix 
this legislation by using disability studies and vulnerability theories.  Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General of Canada Jody Wilson-Raybould (2016) explained that that the policy is 
meant to strike a balance between accessibility and protecting those that are vulnerable (Justice 
Committee Meeting, 2016). Wilson-Raybould is arguing this without having a clear 
understanding of what it means to be vulnerable and how vulnerability may impact autonomy, 
dignity, or quality of life. Bill C-14 (2016) may appear to be a well-put together Bill because it 
provides guidelines for MAID to be followed within Canada, but the truth is that the Bill does 
more harm than good to those suffering and seeking end-of-life options. Bill C-14 (2016) has a 
purpose to protect those who may become vulnerable, but to still provide an accessible and 
autonomous choice to those who are competent enough to do so, in ending their lives. However 
its safeguards serve more as a prohibitive protection rather than as safeguards because 
individuals requesting MAID must meet all of the criteria.  
'Reasonably Foreseeable Death’  
A major shortcoming of Bill C-14 (2016) is first and foremost the ambiguity of the 
eligibility criteria, specifically section 241. 2 (d); that an individual’s death must be ‘reasonably 
foreseeable.’ The Carter decision did not include a reasonably foreseeable criterion, a more 
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important component used by the SCC was that the individual must be a competent adult (Carter 
v. Canada, 2015, para. 147).  This component was important for the Carter decision because the 
plaintiff was a competent adult, therefore, they ruled that PAD would be legalized under such 
terms. The Carter decision ruled that a prohibitive ban was catching individuals that did not fall 
under a category of ‘vulnerable’ (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 86); this is important because the 
SCC concluded that not all individuals seeking MAID are vulnerable, and though they may have 
some sort of disability they can still be capable of making a competent decision, without 
coercion (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 86). I draw attention to this point, because while 
examining Bill C-14 (2016) one must look at the SCC ruling of Carter, and understand that the 
assisted-dying became legal in Canada because the SCC found that the violations of s. 7 rights of 
the Charter were not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice because they found 
that the law was overbroad. Bill C-14 (2016) is overbroad as well; it is a policy with the same 
purpose to protect the vulnerable—and to prohibit MAID and only allow those who are dying. 
Canada argues that it is difficult to conclusively identify the “vulnerable”, and that 
therefore it cannot be said that the prohibition is overbroad. Indeed, Canada asserts, 
“every person is potentially vulnerable” from a legislative perspective (Carter v. Canada, 
Attorney General, 2015, para. 87)  
Although vulnerability is hard to assess from Parliament’s perspective, I would argue that for 
MAID, it is not up to Parliament to determine vulnerability, it is up to the medical practitioners 
involved to assess possible vulnerabilities, which they are doing. Furthermore, I would argue that 
it is up to Parliament to draft legislation that follows a SCC ruling, and that the enactment of Bill 
C-14 (2016) does not follow or even consider the key elements and arguments of the Carter 
ruling. Overbreadth was a key component of Carter, and a prohibitive ban on assisted-dying was 
found to be overbroad because the law was being imposed on those that were not vulnerable and 
did not need to be protected (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 86). In addition to this, overbreadth 
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is applied in a sense that is not infringing society but to whether a law infringes on an individual 
that has no connection with the law (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 85) This principle of 
overbreadth can be easily applied to Bill C-14 (2016)’s criteria since the law “prohibit[s] more 
conduct than is necessary to achieve the state objective” (BCCLA, Lamb Notice of Civil Claim, 
2016, p. 12).  This means that though the law allows medical practitioners to make individual 
assessments, ultimately, the legislation is preventing them from providing a specific set of people 
within society, those being anyone suffering from a grievous or irremediable condition that does 
not have a reasonably foreseeable death or is not yet in a state of irreversible decline (BCCLA, 
Lamb Notice of Civil Claim, 2016, p. 12).  A concern that arises from this violation of rights is 
that Bill C-14 (2016) does not preserve life if it creates the possibility that an individual may take 
their own life earlier than they would from a natural death, or a physician-assisted death. If the 
purpose of the original blanket prohibition on assisted-dying was to protect the vulnerable, and to 
preserve the sanctity of life, then policy makers should recognize that the implementation of 
unconstitutional legislation could do the opposite of preserving the sanctity of life. Bedford 
(2012) Judge MacPherson held:  
When a court is required to decide whether there is a sufficient connection between 
crime-creating legislation and an alleged interference with an individual’s right to 
security of the person, the court must examine the effect of that legislation in the world in 
which it actually operates. This assessment is a practical and pragmatic one. (Canada 
(Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2012, para. 370).  
Moreover, it was argued in Carter by the Trial Judge that the right to life is only to be 
engaged when the policy, law and legislation may cause or create the possibility of death and so 
“the right to life is limited to a right to not die” (Court of Appeal, para. 1322, in Carter, 2015, 
para. 61). It is possible that individuals may have taken their own life prematurely, because they 
could not receive an assisted death, then, their right to life or ‘right to not die’ are impacted upon, 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 67 
since the government’s blanket prohibition would arguably be the cause of said death or suicide. 
This argument has become a real possibility because of a recent development in the BCCLA 
Lamb case that has added a plaintiff by the name of Robyn Moro. Moro is also challenging the 
reasonably foreseeable clause in Bill C-14 (2016) because she suffers from Parkinson’s disease 
and is suffering intolerably (Bryden, 2017). Moro meets all the other eligibility criteria, but does 
not have a foreseeable death; she has made note in an interview with the Globe and Mail that she 
will take matters into her own hands and starve herself if the legal proceedings take too much 
time or fail (Bryden, 2017).  Moro added that:  
What’s the point of waiting until somebody’s almost dead before you do anything about 
it? I think they [Prime Minister Justin Trudeau & Justice Minister Jody Wilson-
Raybould] should see the result of what they’ve done. It’s fine to create a law and then 
walk away from it and not think about it too much…but if they had to see people actually 
having to do themselves in, maybe it would shake them up a little bit.” (Robyn Moro in 
Bryden, Globe and Mail, 2017).  
This demonstrates that the law is working backwards, prohibiting those that are suffering 
intolerably from accessing the right to die without giving them the reassurance that they need to 
know that they can access this right when need be, instead, forcing them to take matters into their 
own hands—in a cruel and inhumane way.  
 In addition, it was evident that though the purpose of the law was to protect those who 
are deemed vulnerable, the law could be implemented in a way that could allow PAD for those 
who were not vulnerable, while still protecting those who are (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 31). 
The section 7 right to life was impacted by the prohibition because without the access of PAD, it 
could be possible that some may take their own lives before they actually need to, for fear of not 
being able to have dignity in dying (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 57). This arguably does not 
protect those among vulnerable populations, such as those with disabilities. Frazee (2003) 
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suggests that it is necessary to overcome social barriers that those living with disabilities face by 
recognizing that: “Disability is not intrinsic, but rather extrinsic. Disability is situated not in an 
individual pathology, but in society’s failure to embrace diverse ways of being in the world.” 
(Frazee, 2003, p. 260). So instead of looking at creating a law that is meant to focus on 
protecting those whom are vulnerable, that it would be in society’s best interests to implement 
policies which are inclusive of all diverse living conditions, instead of creating more social 
barriers. A person is arguably disabled because of the environment they are in, because if there 
was ease of access for those facing impairments (that may make them vulnerable) it would not be 
a disability anymore—but rather a condition of living. The concept that disability is extrinsic 
rather than intrinsic goes against how policy is created currently because Bill C-14 (2016) 
specifically looks at disability (and vulnerability) as an individual category that requires the state 
to provide extensive safeguards for and blanket safeguards for all of society. But if policy makers 
applied this concept that disability is extrinsic, they could look at disability less as a feature of 
what these individuals live with. This would help because it would create a policy that does not 
feature the problem with an individual but addressing the bigger problem with the system that 
society is built upon. Policy should be accessible to all individuals and all individuals should be 
included in policy—this should be the goal. Rather, make policy accessible to these populations 
that are living in a disabled state or intolerable state of suffering. Addressing the fact that there is 
not a balance of accessibility and protection, but a weighted scale making policy even more 
difficult to navigate or access. The problems with policy and accessibility in Canada cannot be 
fixed entirely by amending Bill C-14 (2016). But, if Bill C-14 (2016) becomes accessible to 
those with disabilities that are not living in an irreversible state of decline or with a reasonably 
foreseeable death, it would be a start to creating policy that is inclusive and also sets an example 
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that disability is extrinsic because society is not viewing those with disabilities as equal human 
beings, but as a group that is protected more so than the rest.  
What Does Reasonably Foreseeable Death Mean? 
Another issue with Bill C-14 (2016)’s reasonably foreseeable criterion is that it is 
arguably ambiguous because it may be difficult to predict if a person’s death is imminent. In 
addition to this, there is no standard definition for reasonably foreseeable in this context. Is it a 
few days, a few weeks, a month, or even a year or two? This could ultimately be left open for the 
discretion of doctors to determine while assessing patients, but this may start a whole conundrum 
of other issues, such as accessibility. For example, if some physicians reasonably foresee a death 
within a few months but others see it as a few years, the patient is subjected to the discretion of 
the medical practitioner, and may suffer longer and ultimately this may impact their quality of 
life. The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada Jody Wilson-Raybould explained to 
the Justice Committee (2016) that:  
The bill was deliberately drafted to respond to the circumstances that were the focus of 
the Carter case, where the court only heard evidence about people with late-stage 
incurable illnesses who were in physical decline and whose natural deaths were 
approaching. The court said the complete prohibition on assisted dying was a violation of 
Charter rights for persons in these circumstances. In this way, the eligibility criteria in 
Bill C-14 comply with the Carter decision. They focus on the entirety of the person's 
medical circumstances and not on the specific list of approved conditions or illnesses. 
(Wilson-Raybould, Justice Committee Meeting, 2016). 
This criterion was meant to allow flexibility for physicians making assessments for patients’ 
eligibility, however, the Carter ruling did not identify a need for a natural foreseeable death and 
that “a patient must be on a trajectory towards death” (Wilson-Raybould, Justice Committee 
Meeting, 2016). Carter ruled that ruled that adults must be able to consent to ending their life, be 
competent, and have a grievous, irremediable medical condition, causes suffering and that it 
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could be a disease, disability or illness (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 127). Therefore, the 
Carter decision did not require Gloria Taylor to have a reasonably foreseeable death to access 
MAID, nor did it overturn the prohibition of assisted-dying on the terms that those requesting it 
must have an imminent death. In addition to this, Gloria Taylor was not necessarily ‘on a 
trajectory towards death’ at all (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 11-12).  
Although physicians and medical practitioners across Canada are held to the same code 
of ethics and standards as set out by different organizations such as the Federation of Regulatory 
Authorities of Canada, The Canadian Medical Association and the Colleges of Physicians and 
Surgeons, medical practitioners may have differing opinions on what can be arguably 
‘reasonably foreseeable.’ However, it is possible that the ambiguity of the ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ criterion might allow for medical practitioners to take care of patients on a case by 
case basis. When an individual’s request for MAID is examined and analyzed under the 
discretion of the medical practitioners involved. This could create issues because it is possible 
that two medical practitioners may not agree on whether the patient has an imminent death, as 
well as that individuals might not even request to access MAID if they do not feel that they meet 
the criteria. Dr. Ellen Wiebe noted that this process is thought out and applied carefully; 
assessments are made individually and that ‘reasonably foreseeable’ can be held to a variety of 
factors such as the life expectancy of the individual and the mitigating factors of the cause of 
their suffering (E. Wiebe, personal interview, February 7, 2017).  
Furthermore, Bill C-14 (2016) specifies that all of an individual’s medical circumstances 
must be taken into consideration when determining whether they have a reasonably foreseeable 
death, but some of those who are suffering from grievous and irremediable conditions are not 
actually dying. For example, Julia Lamb, the plaintiff that the BCCLA is representing is not 
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dying or terminally-ill. She suffers from a ‘progressive degenerative disease’ that causes her to 
have medical complications, and unfortunately, she could live in a state of suffering for a long 
period of time (Notice of Civil Claim, 2016, para. 8-10). She does not have a ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ death which prevents her from accessing this right, when she may feel that she can 
no longer endure her suffering (Notice of Civil Claim, 2016, para. 8-10). She is not on a 
trajectory towards death. This eligibility criterion creates an issue because it is forcing 
individuals to suffer and because of whatever they suffer from, whether it be a disease, an 
incurable illness or a disability, if their death is not reasonably foreseeable, they lose their right 
to autonomy and MAID because of it. This aspect of Bill C-14 (2016) proves to be 
discriminatory and is unconstitutional under sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter because the Act 
is preventing individuals such as Julia Lamb from accessing or requesting MAID. Although it 
may appear that the Bill is trying to protect those with vulnerabilities from being coerced into an 
assisted-death, it should not produce a blanket of inaccessibility to those that are willing and able 
to consent to die when they see fit. The BCCLA in the Notice of Civil Claim for Julia Lamb’s 
case notes that:  
The right to liberty is engaged and infringed by state interference with the right of the 
individual to a protected sphere of autonomy over decisions of fundamental personal 
importance. The choice to live or die, and to control the when and how of one’s 
death, are decisions of profound and fundamental importance…the restrictions 
imposed under the impugned laws, to the extent that they operate to prohibit access to 
medical assistance in dying, result in a deprivation of the s. 7 rights of the individuals 
to life, liberty and security of the person. (BCCLA, Notice of Civil Claim, 2016, p. 
12).  
The BCCLA also made note in the Notice of Civil Claim that there are many other conditions 
that individuals may live with that cause irremediable suffering and that many of these 
conditions impact those whom are living in these states before the reach the state of being 
reasonably foreseeable or in a “stage of irreversible decline in capability” (BCCLA, Notice of 
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Civil Claim, 2016, p. 10). It is also important to recognize that the Carter decision identified that 
not every individual that “wishes to commit suicide is vulnerable and … there may be people 
with disabilities who have a considered, rational and persistent wish to end their own lives” 
(Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 86). This is important because it shows that the Carter decision 
did identify with the concept of vulnerability and disability, held that medical practitioners are 
capable to assess each case individually to ensure that no one is being coerced, or under any 
duress to request MAID. Therefore, it is rather astonishing that Bill C-14 (2016) was passed 
without taking these fundamental aspects of the case that legalized assisted-dying into 
consideration.   
Though Bill C-14 (2016) requires an individual’s death to be reasonably foreseeable, it 
does not require an individual to be suffering from a terminal illness. Meaning a fatal illness that 
will eventually end the individual’s life naturally. Although one of the criteria in Bill C-14 
(2016) also states that an individual must be in ‘irreversible decline’ (241.2. b), it again does not 
state that an individual must be terminally ill. This is a shortcoming, but not in the sense that 
terminally ill should be a requirement. This criterion is somewhat contradictory because an 
individual’s death must be ‘reasonably foreseeable,’ but not necessarily terminal. It is confusing 
how one can be non-terminally ill and have reasonably foreseeable death that is predictable and 
likely. This this ‘reasonably foreseeable’ criterion creates more ambiguity and questions than 
necessary.  
Important Issues Still Not Addressed 
To examine Bill C-14 (2016) one should make note of the fact that the issue of the 
mentally ill, mature minors, and advanced requests were not mentioned at all. The independent 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 73 
review requirement is located at the end of Act which is meant to address these issues.  
Considering the amount of time that the Act had to be enacted, and the amount of research, 
reports, recommendations by different scholars and organizations, as well as models from other 
countries, it is a major downfall that some of these individuals such as mentally ill or mature 
minors specifically are disregarded in this law. Advanced consent to assisted-dying is also 
important because some individuals may feel that their life would not be autonomous if they 
could not eventually make the choice to die because it’s what they believe to be their wish.  
We can see that s. 7 is being violated by overbreadth, the SCC has traditionally reacted to 
the infringement with a suspended declaration of invalidity, to give Parliament enough time to 
review their law and create a remedy (Hogg, 2012, p. 204). This was the remedy chosen by the 
SCC in the Carter case, since it was important to create policy that would fit the needs of society 
but still preserve the intended purpose of protecting the vulnerable, and preventing suicide (at 
least prematurely).  
Vulnerability 
As discussed above, how vulnerability is difficult to identify and “every person is 
potentially vulnerable from a legislative perspective” (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 87). This 
section will address this issue by applying perspectives that could be useful in amending or 
implementing policy. Disability studies are a useful approach to help policy and law become 
accessible to those who are impaired by a disability. By understanding what disability is, it may 
help to decipher whether or not a policy is preventing an individual with a disability from 
accessing a right that others within society can access or disallowing an individual from making 
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an autonomous decision and forcing them to forgo their dignity because of their disability. 
Carter ruled that: 
Other people with disabilities take the opposite view, arguing that a regime which permits 
control over the manner of one’s death respects, rather than threatens, their autonomy and 
dignity, and that the legalization of physician-assisted suicide will protect them by 
establishing stronger safeguards and oversight for end-of-life medical care. (Carter v. 
Canada, 2015, para. 10) 
This regime that was favourable to some in Carter has proven to be a more restrictive and 
less autonomous than expected by those with disabilities because the law has not become more 
accessible or helpful in handling end-of-life care; it has basically gone from a prohibitive ban to 
a restrictive policy.  In the Report of the Special Joint Committee, members of Disability 
Advisory committees were heard and made suggestions to the panel by noting the importance of 
balancing safeguards for vulnerable individuals but also making a recommendation of 
accessibility for those who are suffering (Ogilvie and Oliphant, 2016, p. 17). This is 
representative of the fact that the panel of the Special Joint Committee and the Patient Centred 
Approach made efforts to hear from those who could provide insight on disability and 
vulnerability. It was also argued in this report that individuals seeking MAID would all be 
vulnerable in one way or another; so, these vulnerabilities should be assessed, and rather than 
preventing access to MAID, proper training for medical practitioners would be a safeguard that 
may help to protect those with irrevocable vulnerability (Ogilvie & Oliphant, 2016, p. 16). It is a 
difficult task to assess an individual’s state of suffering, because suffering is arguably perceived 
by individuals in a very different way. It is therefore important for policy to be adaptable on a 
case by case basis to ensure that everyone’s assessment is not generalizable to all individuals 
requesting MAID.   
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Most of the recommendations made by the Special Joint Committee were not taken into 
consideration when implementing the policy. In fact, if one compares the recommendations from 
the Special Joint Committee to Bill C-14 (2016), very few suggestions were implemented and so 
the ‘patient centred approach’ was set aside, as were many of the perspectives heard within the 
report. This is an unfortunate reality of Bill C-14 (2016) is that it does not help to prevent 
intolerable suffering, it only seeks to protect the vulnerable. We can also see this invalidation of 
lived experiences of those who are considered/deemed to be vulnerable because policy does not 
take into account that one does not have to be physically dying to wish to access MAID—many 
illnesses/ailments/disabilities do not cause death, in fact, some face complications that may cause 
death, but not in a reasonably foreseeable manner, and this is preventing those individuals from 
having the reassurance that they will be able to seek out an assisted-death when they no longer 
feel that they can cope with their experience of suffering. This is significant for MAID policy 
because some individuals are unable to access end-of-life options such as assisted-dying in 
facilities that do not offer it. These individuals are being discriminated against and are forced to 
suffer because they must be transferred out of these institutions to receive access to their right. 
Individuals are living without the reassurance that they will be able to seek out the help that they 
might wish to receive and it may put pressure on these individuals, impacting their quality of life, 
and could cause them to end their lives prematurely, which completely defeats the purpose of the 
intent of Bill C-14 (2016) in the first place.   
Nussbaum’s (2006) capabilities approach is a useful approach to assess the quality of life 
of an individual, help to inform the working definition of vulnerability since many of the 
capabilities that those who are vulnerable do not have are characteristics that the majority take 
for granted. The capabilities approach could be used while implementing policy into Canadian 
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legislation because the importance of the ten human capabilities approach that she frames is also 
what could be argued as ‘societal values’ such as bodily integrity and living without 
discrimination (p. 77). In applying this approach to policy, Nussbaum explains that the goal is to 
have all members of society to be living a life of quality above and beyond what she terms the 
‘capability threshold’ (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 71). Nussbaum notes that society must move away 
from the average ranking system for the population and move towards a model that illustrates 
individual quality of life (2006, p. 72). Furthermore, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach supports 
these rights as the ‘central human capabilities’ because they are necessary for a life worth living, 
and a life lived with dignity (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 78). Therefore, the autonomy of competent 
individuals must not be disrespected, and the Carter decision displays this. Quality of life and 
dignity are intertwined with the concept of autonomy. An individual’s quality of life is 
demoralized when they are not allowed to make their own decisions regarding their life; not only 
can this be detrimental to one’s beliefs, but also to their health, since, while making medical 
decisions, quality of life is likely a contributing factor to those who are seeking options, such as 
MAID. In addition, it goes hand in hand with dignity. Dignity is what those who wish to receive 
MAID are looking to accomplish—to preserve their own lives until they can no longer live a 
quality life, and so having autonomy over their body, allows them to exit their lives with dignity, 
and fulfill their dying wishes. Nussbaum (2006) argues that the capabilities approach is 
universal, as does Fineman’s (2010) vulnerability (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 78; Fineman, 2010, p. 
267). These concepts are both universal because the need to live a dignified life is arguably 
universal and so vulnerability needs to be universally accepted; individuals experiencing 
vulnerability still wish to live a dignified life (Fineman, 2010, p. 267). Lid explains that to 
intertwine the concepts of vulnerability and disability can be tricky because individuals with 
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disabilities are often regarded as “containers of vulnerability” (Lid, 2015, p. 1563). Universality 
illustrates the importance for policy makers to approach policy making in a way that is inclusive 
of the rights of those with a condition such as a disability, and the use of a framework that is 
inclusive of vulnerabilities too would help to institute a more equal and inclusive society, with 
the purpose to understand vulnerabilities such as a disability (Lid, 2015, p. 1563). In applying 
Nussbaum’s (2006) capabilities there is overlap with the Charter, individuals should have the 
right to autonomy, and self-determination; this could be implemented into MAID policy by 
changing the purpose of the law from protecting the vulnerable to instead protecting all of 
society. In protecting society, it is arguable that this could mean that all individuals should be 
protected from having their right to autonomy taken away (as it is being taken away from those 
in which the law is currently trying to protect). So, to change policy by using a framework that is 
inclusive of vulnerability (or disability) essentially means to provide equal protection, equal 
opportunity, equal accessibility, equal rights—not extra protection by means of prohibiting 
access. Cory Ruf in the interview for this research noted that the BCCLA and Lamb have the 
support of Dying with Dignity Canada because the law is discriminatory and does not abide by 
the Carter ruling (C. Ruf, personal interview, March 13th, 2017). This support may be helpful in 
raising awareness and identifying the key issues for the future of assisted-dying in Canada. 
Prohibiting to specific population such as those that are disabled is unconstitutional because their 
disability does not forgo their right to equal protection or equal benefit of the law. Ultimately, 
this identification of the necessary application of s. 15(1) will likely be seen in future court 
proceedings with the BCCLA and Lamb.  
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Charter ‘Dialogue’ 
Bill C-14 (2016) is failing Canadians because Parliament did not abide by the Carter 
decision in drafting this legislation. Policy makers ignored the fact that some senators thought 
the Bill to be unconstitutional because of the reasonably foreseeable criterion. The Bill was 
passed and some have stated that they hope the courts will fix this issue (Fine & Stone, 2016); 
however, a remedy might not be quick to make its appearance—the Carter case is a prime 
example of how long it can take to go through the proceedings. Also, legislature had ample time 
to draft legislation that correlated with the SCC’s decision, yet they did not. So, there’s really no 
way of knowing that when the law is challenged that policy makers will address the issue in 
accordance to the ruling. It appears that policy makers have put themselves above the law and 
above the courts. This is ultimately not a failing of Bill C-14 (2016) but a failure to the system in 
which Bill C-14 (2016) was created within.  
In understanding the implementation of policy, a discussion that plays a key role is the 
concept of ‘Charter dialogue.’ This approach helps to explain the conversation between the 
courts and legislatures while addressing the implementation of already enacted policies, and 
those which are being proposed. In addition, this theory has been widely discussed since the 
enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, and so this dialogue has 
made advancements and evolutions throughout the way—with a dialogue about dialogue. The 
next section will explore certain aspects of this dialogue and analyze how the courts and 
legislatures are meant to work together while seeking out ways to implement law that 
demonstrates the values of the Charter. In addition, the next section will argue that though 
‘Charter dialogue’ is evident from cases that have been brought to the Supreme Court of Canada 
(SCC), it is possible for dialogue to be ignored, or overruled by legislative bodies.   
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Hogg, Thornton and Bushell (2007) illuminate the concept of legislation being created 
after the SCC makes an important decision regarding a Charter challenge as “Charter dialogue” 
(p. 4). Charter dialogue means that when the Courts come to a decision regarding a Charter 
challenge, parliament usually responds by creating or amending legislation to fit the needs of the 
ruling while still making note of a law’s original purpose. his dialogue which Hogg et al. (2007) 
are referring to is crucial in understanding the way that Canadian policy is implemented because 
it is representative of the fact that the courts do have influence on legislatures. However, Hogg et 
al. (2007) make note that even if the courts decide that a law or piece of legislation infringes on 
the Charter, does not mean that Parliament will necessarily change a law and “in most instances, 
the judicial decision did not preclude legislation that continued to pursue the objectives of the 
original law” (Hogg et al. 2007 p. 4).   
Decisions made by the courts regarding policy and law may not be of interest to the 
political party in power, so changes made by Parliament may not become a priority if they do not 
fit the direction that the political party in power is guided by. Hogg et al. (2007) explain that 
even if the courts rule on a law, it does not necessarily mean that the law will be changed or 
addressed at all (p. 46). Hogg et al. (2007) argue that this is due to the ‘concentration of power’ 
(p. 43) in Canada, and that those in power generally have the last say in what happens to 
legislation since some decisions made by the courts may not fit the needs or the plan that the 
political party in power has (p. 43). Peter Julian of the NDP in British Columbia noted that: 
The Liberals chose to play politics with this matter of rights [the right to medical 
assistance in dying, as per Carter]. The Liberals refused to listen to the experts and 
rejected all of the opposition’s substantive amendments… two courts, the Alberta Court 
of Appeal and the Ontario Superior Court, say that what the Minister of Justice just said 
is wrong, and we trust those court decisions. 
The Liberals have badly mishandled medically assisted dying. It should have been non-
partisan and evidence-based, and they have made it political. They steamrolled 
Parliament to pass an unconstitutional bill. Now the Senate is refusing to pass the 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 80 
legislation without the amendments we proposed. Liberals know full well that their bill 
will not survive a court challenge. Will they now admit that the bill must be fixed, and 
will they fix it? (Peter Julian, NDP, House of Commons, Hansard #69 of the 42nd 
Parliament 1st Session. June 9th, 2016).  
 
Julian’s comments in the House of Commons represent a deep underlying issue with 
Canadian politics. Primarily that there was ignorance towards MPs while implementing 
legislation and that the constitutionality of the Bill was brought into question and ignored. This is 
an example of Charter ‘dialogue’ being brought up and ignored. This bill will likely need to be 
reformed but the issues were identified whilst it was still being drafted, so a constitutional 
challenge likely could have been avoided.  
Hogg et al. (2007) make note that “Charter decisions rarely defeat a major legislative 
policy” (p. 40). If this is true, then the courts must continue the discussion between legislatures 
and judicial review, by hearing the issues that infringe upon the Charter. This may create an 
immediate response from policy makers, but perhaps it may create a disturbance in the way the 
political party in power is perceived by the public; this disturbance could be a public outcry by 
means of a protest, or a loss of power in the next election. This is important since Hogg et al. 
state that ultimately in this democracy, society usually agrees with judicial decisions related to 
the Charter (2007, p. 42). I society generally agrees with judicial decisions, then it is possible to 
insinuate that the courts do hold some power towards change in legislation. Hogg et al. argue that 
it is up to the Court to interpret the Charter, and this helps to protect the rights of society (2007, 
p. 42). Hiebert (2002) argues that the dialogue between the Court and Parliament is a joint effort 
in interpreting the Charter (p. 4); and that the Charter is meant to be used to inform the creation 
of policy (p. 4). Hiebert states that:   
The Constitutional status of the Charter increases the relevance of political evaluation of 
bills because new consequences arise from inconsistencies between legislation and 
protected rights. Courts are empowered not only to review legislation but also to grant 
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remedies for breaches, which may include the nullification of legislation in whole or in 
part (Hiebert, 2002, p. 7).   
 
Historically, Roach (2007) explains that there has been a dialogue between the SCC and 
Parliament, since the Courts have helped to interpret and explain policy since the beginning of 
the common law (p. 456). Therefore, dialogue is merely a feature that has been expanded on 
since the implementation of the Charter in 1982. Hiebert (2002) explains that the dynamics 
between the Court and Parliament suggest that there have been adaptations made to the 
implementation of bills regarding important rights. If the government fails to abide by a judicial 
review, or implements legislation that fails to work with the Charter rights, there are 
consequences for these bodies of power and these consequences have made other public 
departments more favourable, such as the Department of Justice (Hiebert, 2002, pp. 7-8). This 
means that the public may favour the Court system more so than policy makers because they 
may feel that they are protecting their rights.  
However, there has been much movement towards reviewing future legislation by 
addressing the Charter in the initial stages of creating new bills, in hopes to avoid future 
challenges and to create legislation that is reasonably applicable to Canadian society (Hiebert, 
2002, p. 7). This is done by a ‘risk assessment’ to see whether a policy may create a Charter 
issue (Hiebert, 2002, p. 8). This task is undertaken by Department of Justice lawyers and are 
labelled on a scale from what risk they create (p. 8).  
It is significant to realize that during the implementation of legislation, a consistent 
Charter dialogue can help to prevent the violation of rights—this dialogue has been suggested by 
justice departments to remedy issues that may arise specifically to the Charter, before they occur 
(Hiebert, 2002, p. 10). Charter assessments and policy can arguably only strengthen a bill in the 
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long run; this is because the government can show that they are recognizing that a somewhat 
sensitive area may need to be reviewed by external bodies so that eventually when the legislation 
is implemented, it does fit the needs of society and fit the original purpose that it was meant to 
fulfil (Hiebert, 2002, p. 10).  
Hiebert (2002) places value on a continuous dialogue between the Court and Parliament 
but not only after the Court provides a ruling. The ruling is important so that Parliament is aware 
of what aspects need to be reviewed, and though this isn’t a real conversation per se, it is still a 
dialogue (p. 50). In addition to this, Sterling (2007) argues that the goal of implementing policy 
is that a negative ruling never comes from a piece of legislation—and so there to be no 
discussion after the fact, rather, that a policy is assessed thoroughly before it receives Royal 
Assent; it is important to realize that most of the implemented legislation does not infringe upon 
Charter rights (Sterling, 2007, p. 141).  
Sterling (2007) notes the two elements that support that the government recognizes the 
importance of Charter values. First, that the government wishes to not have legal issues arise 
from an implemented policy, and second, by creating policies that do not create Charter 
challenges, it supports the values of the Charter (Sterling, 2007, pp. 147-148). I agree with this, 
partially because in theory the government believes in the Charter, and believes that individuals 
should believe that they have their rights—but if an individuals’ rights being imposed upon are 
interfering with a political motive/value that does not correspond with the political power’s 
beliefs/values, then it is possible that these rights may be overlooked. Public values are hard to 
determine, since Canada is divided by provinces/territories, different religions, differing political 
values. I think it is likely that to take into account the public values means to take into account 
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the most favoured by society since they hold the majority. However, it is possible to argue that 
since the Charter values have been interpreted differently over many years, that the public values 
have as well, and so they may be arguably linked (Carter, 2015).  
The concept of governing while using the Charter is using the dialogue between 
Parliament and the Court to connect the rights of the Charter with the anticipated policies and 
their purposes (Kelly, 2005, p. 223). Kelly makes note of the fact that though ultimately advice 
by the Court or by assessments made by other bodies such as lawyers or the Department of 
Justice, the advice can be ignored (Kelly, 2005, p. 224). This is representative of the 
implementation of Bill C-14 (2016) when there were senators stating that they felt the policy was 
unconstitutional (Fine & Stone, 2016). What’s more, is that there were MPs and Committee’s 
created while drafting this policy and yet their recommendations vastly were ignored. Peter Hogg 
addressed Bill C-14 (2016) specifically and advised that the Bill would be challenged (Dying 
with Dignity, 2016). The Carter decision advised that: “It is for Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures to respond, should they so choose, by enacting legislation consistent with the 
constitutional parameters set out in these reasons” (Carter v. Canada, 2015, para. 126), but, it is 
clear now that Bill C-14 (2016) has been implemented that the legislation is not consistent with 
the decision made by the SCC. Kelly (2005) strongly suggests that the invalidation of policy is 
an indication of what goals retain to the political party in power, and ultimately are 
representative of those bodies (p. 224). Additionally, decisions regarding the reaction to a 
declaration of invalidity are arguably political in their nature—meaning that the policy 
implemented is meant to suit the position and agenda of those in power (Kelly, 2005, p. 224).  
Bill C-14 (2016) is an unconstitutional piece of legislation implemented by policy makers 
that did not care to listen to advising councils, committees or court rulings while drafting a 
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policy that was meant to fit the needs of society. Bill C-14 (2016) is representative of the failing 
system of government and policy and this failing system will continue to produce poor policies 
unless real change and motivation to change occurs. Sadly, specific to assisted-dying legislation 
in Canada, it may take a lot of time to challenge the law, and these lengthy proceedings will 
cause more harm and suffering, as well as possibly forcing individuals to take their lives 
prematurely all because of a safeguard that fails to provide safety. Autonomy, dignity and liberty 
were all key components in the Carter decision but as it stands for the law implemented by the 
government, there are members of society that are apparently not entitled to live an autonomous, 
dignified and liberty filled life. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions: What’s Next for Policy  
Canadian policy has taken a step forward by implementing Bill C-14 (2016) and 
legalizing assisted-dying; some Canadians are now able to access this end-of-life right and end 
their intolerable suffering. Unfortunately, Bill C-14 (2016) it has proven to be inaccessible, 
restrictive, and ambiguous in many ways, as were discussed. It is important that policy makers 
recognize that when a law that they support is found to be unconstitutional that it is necessary to 
remedy the issue that makes a law unconstitutional. I would argue that we are not there yet; the 
Carter v. Canada (2015) ruling exemplifies this by striking down the prohibitive ban of assisted-
dying, all the while the legislative response was to implement a policy that remains to be just as 
restrictive and unconstitutional. Hogg (2007) explained that even when legislation is found to be 
unconstitutional, it does not mean that a law will be created that does not serve the law’s original 
purpose (p. 4). It is likely that until Bill C-14 (2016) is found unconstitutional through a lengthy 
court ruling (such as the one brought by Julia Lamb), the rights of those wishing to access MAID 
and make the autonomous decision to do so, will have to wait. They will be among many others 
waiting to hear the verdict of their lives. In 1992, Sue Rodriguez asked “If I cannot give consent 
to my own death, whose body is this? Who owns my life?”  (CBC News, 1992). The answer 
unfortunately is not a given, and though it is certain that Rodriguez would meet the criteria of 
Bill C-14 (2016) today, her question remains true to many Canadians whom are living a life 
without the sureness of their dignity or autonomy, without quality of life, and without the 
fundamental freedoms of life, liberty and security of the person.  
It is possible to resolve the shortcomings of Bill C-14 (2016) in the next couple of years, but 
also to use the independent reviews to approach possible changes to policy in a way that supports 
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those that are may wish to access MAID. Minimally, policy should be accessible to those 
individuals that meet all of the eligibility criteria. What’s more, is policy should be not be 
discriminatory or implemented when it is likely that it was deemed or argued to be 
unconstitutional before it was even enacted. There is little information on how the independent 
reviews will be conducted or whether they will be using models from other parts of the world to 
help answer difficult questions such as MAID and mature minors, mentally ill and advanced 
consent. The independent reviews produced may provide a wealth of knowledge and insight to 
navigate these difficult issues within MAID policy, but the Canadian government has already 
proven to be narrow-minded while considering policy changes. This is illustrated by the process 
of the enactment of Bill C-14 (2016) and how few of the patient-centred policy recommendations 
that were made were put into policy. If these reports and committees were put together prior to 
the drafting of Bill C-14 (2016), to provide feedback and recommendations to Parliament, it is 
not distinctly clear why a policy that is not in accordance to the Carter v. Canada (2015) ruling 
implemented. Bill C-14 (2016) does not use a patient-centred approach, or even a vulnerabilities 
approach—yet, the Act’s preamble recognizes the importance to protect vulnerable populations 
(Bill C-14, 2016). This is hypocritical because it is clear that Parliament does not know how 
determine vulnerability, how protect those who may be vulnerable, whom experiences it, how it 
can be experienced, and lastly, what/who created the concept of vulnerability.   
Some priorities that need to be addressed by Parliament are that first and foremost, MAID 
needs to be accessible throughout the provinces, especially in publicly funded institutions. 
Institutions that refuse to provide services that a patient may wish to receive should be held 
accountable by helping them reach those services in a timely manner. Institutions should not be 
able to refuse MAID if they have a willing physician to aid the patient in need. Forcing 
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individuals to transfer to another institution or leave the premises is inhumane, especially when 
they are in need of a supportive health care system in their final days. It is necessary for policy to 
come up with a consistent way to determine capacity—one that does not use age as a limit. Age 
may not be a consistent use of determining one’s ability to give consent because across Canada, 
the age of majority differs in each province, and, those who have reached age of consent but are 
still considered to be minors are able to make other life-changing decisions about their lives. 
Mature minors should go through the same assessment criterion that any other individual would 
go through to receive an assisted-death.  
The most important aspect of policy that needs to be addressed is the ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ criterion. The ambiguity it applies does not support patients in need, it provides 
uncertainty and may impact whether physicians wish to provide MAID if they are tentative of 
the standards because of this ambiguous criterion. Limiting access to MAID by declaring that all 
individuals must have an imminent demise will prove to continue forcing members of society 
that are suffering to continue to live in this state of intolerable suffering, and unfortunately, they 
may be forced to take their own life prematurely, travel abroad or receive MAID in an unlawful 
way.   
The enactment of Bill C-14 (2016), Ontario has drafted legislation called Bill 84: An Act to 
amend various Acts with respect to medical assistance in dying. This piece of legislation is 
currently being considered by the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs. Dying 
with Dignity Canada (2017) has made statements regarding the proposed piece of legislation 
explaining what amendments members of parliament are seeking to make. Some positives that 
Bill 84 would provide with for those in Ontario would be that it would make it less worrisome 
for medical practitioners to be involved in MAID, by ensuring that they will not be brought into 
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lawsuits so longs as they follow the standards and guidelines put forth in Bill C-14 (2016) 
(Dying with Dignity, 2017). In addition, it would help to provide clarity for declarations on 
insurance policies and ensure that family members of those individuals receiving MAID will still 
be able to make claims even if they receive MAID, by making this law (Dying with Dignity, 
2017). However, these two aspects of Bill 84 may be positive, there are several issues that arise 
with this proposed legislation. The issues that are apparent within these amendments illustrate 
the fact that Parliament is still not using a patient centered-approach to create policy. First and 
foremost, by protecting public institutions from reporting their policies or producing these 
records when asked for in respect to assisted dying. According to Dying with Dignity Canada 
(2017), this is problematic because it makes it difficult for individuals accessing these facilities 
to know what rights they can access while using them, such as MAID, and this impacts the 
accessibility and clarity of the patients (Dying with Dignity Canada, 2017). Secondly, by making 
it law, in accordance with Bill C-14’s (2016) criteria that all MAIDs must still be reported to a 
local coroner. This is detrimental to the families involved because if a coroner sees fit, they may 
initiate an investigation of a MAID if it is not up to standards; this is a sensitive matter for 
families, and not one that needs to create more fear, or uncertainty (Dying with Dignity Canada, 
2017). This may also deter an individual from accessing their right to MAID if they believe that 
it could cause harm to their loved ones in which they would be leaving behind, thus forcing them 
to suffer more so than necessary. Finally, calling MAID a suicide—this term is damaging to the 
family members involved, but it is also detrimental to data collected by the government. If 
MAID is being reported as a suicide, it may impact the real statistics and impact future 
amendments to MAID policy (Dying with Dignity Canada, 2017). Another issue with labelling 
MAID a suicide is that policy has moved away from the term ‘assisted suicide’ and as 
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recommended by the Special Joint Committee toward the use of the term medical assistance in 
dying (MAID) (Ogilvie & Oliphant, 2016), thus creating another policy that does not use the 
same term is inconsistent and misleading. In other words, Bill 84 is just an example of how the 
assisted-dying debate is ongoing; there are clearly many aspects of MAID policy being reviewed.  
It is also important to discuss how Bill 84 will impact Canadian society, far and wide. If Bill 
84 receives Royal Assent, it will be interesting to see whether other provinces follow suit with a 
similar provincial piece of legislation. Also important is the point that if Ontario’s Bill 84 is 
passed, what will happen to Ontarians? Will they be forced to access MAID outside of their 
province, away from their homes, and their families because of the inability to access or know 
which facilities/practices offer this end-of-life right? Even more considerable is the fact that 
classifying assisted-deaths as a suicide may prevent individuals with religious beliefs/morals 
from accessing MAID because it would be a sinful act to do so. Furthermore, identifying MAID 
by reporting it as a suicide is inconsistent with policy that defines it as a medically assisted death. 
These are all questions which need to be addressed, because if the purpose of the law is to 
protect individual’s rights and those that are vulnerable, then isn’t it necessary to examine issues 
with the approach of those whom will be impacted by the enactment?  
Bill C-14 (2016) was passed and enacted with haste. Had the Senate continued to fight with 
the support from others (some of those quoted in this research), they may have been met with a 
standstill in the advancement of the policy or removal of the reasonably foreseeable clause. This 
is represented by the fact that the Senate originally voted against this requirement. But, coming 
to a standstill (for weeks, months or even years) would have been damaging to many Canadians 
wishing to access MAID and so it could have been in their best interest to pass the Act. However, 
in passing Bill C-14 (2016), it has proven to exemplify the disdain for the rights of those that do 
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not meet the criterion. The autonomy and fundamental rights of these individuals that are unable 
to access MAID have been set aside and have basically been prohibited from requesting end-of-
life help. It is arguable that the ambiguity of this policy was motivated by those that do not wish 
to really make a change to the law, and that do not want to be held accountable for individual’s 
taking their own life. In addition, John Wallace, an independent Senator noted concern for the 
“normalization of suicide” (Tunney, CBC News, 2016) This could be related to why the 
reasonably foreseeable clause was stringently kept in the policy. It is interesting that some policy 
makers have argued that the Bill does not abide by Carter, while others defend that it does, while 
still, there are few others that state that there is no need to follow the Carter ruling because of the 
bigger picture (Tunney, CBC News, 2016); this lack of agreement or consistency in 
understanding the SCC ruling illuminates how messy the process of drafting legislation is, and 
definitively displays the failing system of policy making in Canada.  
It is my hope that this thesis creates a discussion towards the shortcomings of Bill C-14 
(2016), but also to illustrate a bigger issue with the creation of Canadian policy and importance 
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The shortcomings of Bill C-14 (2016) are a priority and 
they need to be examined by using the proper methods to ensure that proposed amendments are 
capturing the needs of Canadian society. However, the future of medically assisted dying in 
Canada does not end with Bill C-14 (2016). In fact, if the approach used by policy makers is 
addressed substantially, it is possible that the future of other policies in Canada will be met with 
perspectives that fit the needs of the policy and those impacted by it. The dialogue between the 
Court and Parliament is necessary, but it is also necessary for the public and scholars to continue 
to help identify issues arising from policy.  
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This research was not exhaustive, many perspectives and ideas had to be left out to provide 
with a concise and focused thesis. However, this research identified many other issues that could 
help to formulate future research questions within the policy and assisted-dying debate. In 
conclusion, a policy review and two semi-structured interviews served this project well, by 
helping to add to the MAID discourse throughout Canada. Assisted-dying is being practiced 
across the globe, with many research surrounding nearly every aspect of the MAID debate; 
therefore, I have no doubt that assisted-dying will eventually be implemented successfully 
throughout Canada. However long this takes, may be the real issue to be considered now, not 
“if” assisted-dying will ever become successfully implemented, but rather when.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 92 
References  
Assisted-suicide crusader Gloria Taylor dies in B.C. (2012).  CBC News. Retrieved from 
http://www.cbc.ca 
Becker, H. S. (2007). Writing for social scientists: how to start and finish your thesis, book, or article 
(2nd edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Bill C-14, an Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts, 
Medical assistance in dying. 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. Assented to on June 17th, 2016.  
Bill 52, An act respecting end-of-life care. 40th legislature, 1st Session. Passed June 2014.  
Bill 84, an Act to amend various Acts with respect to medical assistance in dying. 1st reading, 
December 7, 2016.  
Browne, A., & Russell, J. S. (2016). Physician-Assisted Death in Canada. Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics, 25(03), 377–383. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180116000025 
Burningham, S. (2015). A Comment on the Courts Decision to Suspend the Declaration of Invalidity 
in Carter v. Canada. Saskatchewan Law Review, 78(201), 1–5. 
Bryden, J. (2016, June 17). Assisted dying Bill C-14 now law. The Canadian Press, Global News. 
Retrieved from http://www.globalnews.ca   
Bryden, J. (2017, May 23). Second plaintiff added to court challenge of assisted-dying law. The 
Canadian Press, The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/  
Butler, J. (2014). Bodily Vulnerability, Coalitions, and Street Politics. Critical Studies, 37, 99–119, 
247. 
Butler, M., & Tiedemann, M. (2015). Carter v. Canada: The Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision on 
Assisted Dying [Background Paper]. Retrieved from 
https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/ResearchPublications/2015-47-e.html  
 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101. 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331. 
Carter, M. (2015). Carter v Canada Societal Interests under Sections 7 and 1. Saskatchewan Law 
Review, (78), 209. 
Chan, B., & Somerville, M. (2016). Converting the “Right to Life” to the “Right to Physician-
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia”: An Analysis of Carter V Canada (attorney General), Supreme 
Court of Canada. Medical Law Review, 24(2), 143–175. https://doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fww005 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 93 
Chazan, D. (2016). Terminally ill child becomes first euthanised minor in Belgium. The Telegraph. 
Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/17/terminally-ill-child-becomes-first-
euthanised-minor-in-belgium/ 
Chochinov, H. M., & Frazee, C. (2016). Finding a balance: Canada’s law on medical assistance in 
dying. The Lancet, 388(10044), 543–545. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)31254-5 
Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119 
Collier, R. (2009). Euthanasia debate reignited. CMAJ: Canadian Medical Association Journal, 
181(8), 463–464. 
The College of Family Physicians of Canada. (2015). A Guide for Reflection on Ethical Issues 
Concerning Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia (pp. 1-11). Report No. 1. Quebec. 
Cooper, F. R. (2014). Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory. North Carolina Law 
Review, 93, 1339–1380. 
Couser, G. T. (2005). Paradigms’ Cost: Representing Vulnerable Subjects. Literature and Medicine, 
24(1), 19–30. https://doi.org/10.1353/lm.2005.0021 
Creswell, J. W. (2013). Chapter 2: Philosophical Assumptions & Interpretative Frameworks. In 
Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design. (pp. 15-41). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Criminal Code R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 
    Davis, L. (2006). The Disability Studies Reader (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge. 
Downie, J. (2004). Dying Justice: A Case for Decriminalizing Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in 
Canada. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press. 
Downie, J., & Bern, S. (2008). Rodriguez Redux. Health Law Journal, 16, 27–54. 
Downie, J., & Oliver, K. (2016). Medical certificates of death: First principles and established 
practices provide answers to new questions. Canadian Medical Association. Journal, 188(1), 49–
52. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.kpu.ca:2080/10.1503 
Dying with Dignity Canada (2017) Email your Ontario MPP: Make Bill 84 put patients first. 
Retrieved from http://www.dyingwithdignity.ca/bill_84_email_a_rep  
Edwards, M. (2016). Changing laws on medical assistance in dying: Implications for critical care 
nurses. Canadian Journal of Critical Care Nursing, 27(3), 18–23. 
The Fight for the Right to Die (2012) CBC News. retrieved from www.cbc.ca  
Fine, S. & Stone, L. (2016) Senate backs down, passes assisted-dying legislation. The Globe and 
Mail. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com  
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 94 
Fineman, M. A. (2010). The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State. Emory Law Journal, 60, 
251–276. 
Frazee, C. (2003). Disability Studies: The Unexpected Guest in Health Law Discourse. Health Law 
Journal, 257–262. 
Garland-Thomson, R. (2003). Integrating Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory.  In (Ed) Davis, 
L. (2006). The Disability Studies Reader (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge. 
Gibson, J., & Taylor, M. (2015). Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on Physician-Assisted 
Dying (pp. 1–65). Canada: Provincial Territorial. 
Government of Canada. (2016) Legislative Background: Medical Assistance in Dying (Bill C-14, as 
Assented to on June 17, 2016). Canada.  
Haggerty, K. D. (2004). Ethics Creep: Governing Social Science Research in the Name of Ethics. 
Qualitative Sociology, 27(4), 391–414. 
Harris, K. (2016). Minors, mentally ill should have right to doctor-assisted death, parliamentarians 
say. CBC News. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/assisted-dying-committee-
recommendations-1.3463392 
Hiebert, J. L. (2002). Charter Conflicts. In Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role? Montreal, 
CA: MQUP. Retrieved from http://www.ebrary.com 
Hogg, P. W., & Bushell, A. (1997). The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (or 
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All). Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 
(35), 75–124. 
Hogg, P. W., Bushell Thornton A. A., & Wright W. K. (2007). Charter Dialogue Revisited: Or “Much 
Ado About Metaphors.” Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 45(1), 1–65. 
Hogg, P. (2012). The Brilliant Career of Section 7 of the Charter. The Supreme Court Law Review: 
Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference, 58(1). Retrieved from 
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol58/iss1/7 
Inside Gloria Taylor’s battle for the right to die. (2012). CBC News. Retrieved February 24, 2017, 
from http://www.cbc.ca  
Julia Lamb and BCCLA v. Canada, Notice of Civil Claim, Supreme Court of British Columbia, (27 
June 2016) 
Julia Lamb and BCCLA v. Canada, Notice of Constitutional Question, Supreme Court of British 
Columbia, (27 June 2016) 
Julia Lamb and BCCLA v. Canada (Attorney General), Response to Civil Claim, Supreme Court of 
British Columbia (27 July 2016) 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 95 
Julian, P. (2016, June 9). Subject Matter of Physician-Assisted Dying. Edited Hansard meeting #69, 
42nd Parliament, 1st session. Retrieved from the Open Parliament of Canada website: 
https://openparliament.ca/debates/2016/6/9/peter-julian-1/  
Kelly, J. B. (2005). Governing with the Charter. In Governing with the Charter: Legislative and 
judicial activism and framers’ intent. Vancouver, CA: UBC Press.  
Kenall, D. (2012). Safety First The Section 7 Harm-Avoidance Principle. National Journal of 
Constitutional Law, (30), 189. 
Kaul, K. (2013). Vulnerability, for Example: Disability Theory as Extraordinary Demand. Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law, 25(1), 81–110. 
Laanela, M. (2016, June 27). Assisted-dying legislation faces new legal challenge in B.C. CBC News. 
Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca  
Lid, I. M. (2015). Vulnerability and disability: a citizenship perspective. Disability & Society, 30(10), 
1554–1567. https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2015.1113162 
MacCharles, T. (June 17 2016.). Assisted dying to become law after Senate backs Liberals’ bill | 
Toronto Star. Retrieved March 21, 2017, from 
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/06/17/senate-votes-not-to-send-assisted-dying-bill-
back-to-mps.html 
McLachlan, H. V. (2008). The Ethics of Killing and Letting Die: Active and Passive Euthanasia. 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 34(8), 636–638. 
Moulton, D. (2015). Assurance for MDs who refuse to assist in dying. Canadian Medical Association. 
Journal, 187(14), E426. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.109-5147 
Nancy B. v. Hôtel-Dieu de Québec (1992), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 385 
Nicol, J., & Tiedemann, M. (2016). Bill C-14: An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make 
related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying) (Legislative Summary No. 42–
1–C14–E) (pp. 1- 22). Canada: Parliament of Canada. 
Nussbaum, M. C. (2006). Social Contracts and Three Unsolved Problems of Justice. Frontiers of 
Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 
Nagy Hesse-Biber, S., & Leavy, P. (2011). The Practice of Qualitative Research (2nd edition).    
 Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Ogilvie, K. K., Hon., & Elephant, R. (2016).  Medical Assistance in Dying: A Patient-Centred 
Approach Report of the Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying (pp. 1-70, Rep. 
No. 1). Ottawa, ON: Parliament of Canada. 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 96 
Palmer, S. (2015). “The Choice Is Cruel”: Assisted Suicide and Charter Rights in Canada. The 
Cambridge Law Journal, 74(2), 191–194. 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008197315000471 
Professional Obligations and Human Rights Policy. (2008). College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Ontario. #2-15. Retrieved from http://www.cpso.on.ca/policies-publications/policy/professional-
obligations-and-human-rights  
 
Roach, K. (2007). A Dialogue About Principle and a Principled Dialogue: Justice Iacobucci’s 
Substantive Approach to Dialogue. University of Toronto Law Journal, 57(2), 449–477. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/tlj.2007.0019 
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519. 
R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 44 DLR (4th) 385. 
Schafer, A. (2012). The great Canadian euthanasia debate. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com 
Schachter v. Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 679 
Smith, M. (1993). The Rodriguez Case: Review of the Supreme Court of Canada Decision on Assisted 
Suicide (No. BP-349E) (pp. 1-9). Canada: Law and Government Division. Retrieved from 
http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp349-e.htm 
Smith, R. (2016). Liberals reject “reasonably foreseeable” amendment to death bill. Life Health 
Professionals News. Retrieved from http://www.lifehealthpro.ca/news/liberals-reject-reasonably-
foreseeable-amendment-to-death-bill-209066.aspx 
 
Sterling, L. (2007). The Charter’s Impact on the Legislative Process: Where the Real “Dialogue” 
Takes Place. National Journal of Constitutional Law; Scarborough, 23, 139–VIII. 
Stewart, H. (2015). Bedford and the Structure of Section 7. McGill Law Journal, 60(3), 575–594. 
Surtees, D. (2015). The Authorizing of Physician-Assisted Death in Carter v Canada (Attorney 
General). Saskatchewan Law Review, (78), 225. 
Tasker, J. P. (2016, June 15). Physician-assisted dying bill passes Senate 64-12, sent back to House 
Senate passes amendments to assisted-dying bill, sends it back to House. CBC News. Retrieved 
from http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/senate-amendments-c14-1.3636488  
 
Thompson, J. (1992) “Who owns my life?” asks ALS patient Sue Rodriguez - CBC Archives. CBC 
News. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/who-owns-my-life 
 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 97 
Throap, A. (June 25 2016). MP Report: The story of Bill C-14 – medically assisted dying: Revelstoke 
Current. Retrieved from http://www.revelstokecurrent.com/2016/06/25/mp-report-the-story-of-
bill-c-14-medically-assisted-dying/  
 
Tiedemann, M., Nicol, J., Dominique Valiquet, & Butler, M. (2013). Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide 
in Canada (Legislative Background No. 2010–68–E) (pp. 1–29). Parliament of Canada: 
Government of Canada. 
Tilley, S. (2016). Doing Respectful Research: Power, Privilege and Passion. Nova Scotia, Canada: 
Fernwood Publishing. 
Tunney, C. (2016, June 8). Senate removes near-death requirement from assisted-dying bill. CBC 
News. Retrieved from: http://www.cbc.ca  
Upshur, R. (2016). Unresolved issues in Canada’s law on physician-assisted dying. The Lancet, 
388(10044), 545–547. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)31255-7 
Vogel, L. (2012). Line between acts and omissions blurred, euthanasia critics argue. CMAJ : 
Canadian Medical Association Journal, 184(1), E19–E20. https://doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.109-
4061 
Von Tigerstrom, B. (2015). Consenting to Physician-Assisted Death Issues Arising from Carter v. 
Canada. Saskatchewan Law Review, (78), 233. 
Wagner, C. B., & Pearl, A. (2016). Do Canadian Doctors Have a Right to Refuse to Refer Patients to 
Physicians Who Will Assist Them to Commit Suicide? Estates and Trusts Reports, 17(4), 1–13. 
Wendell, S. (1989). Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability. In (Ed) Davis, L. (2006). The Disability 
Studies Reader (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge. 
Wendell, S. (1996). The Rejected Body. In Social Construction of Disability. New York: Routledge. 
Wilson-Raybould, J. (2016, May 2). Subject Matter of Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Criminal Code 
and to make related amendments. Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Edited Hansard 
meeting #10, 42nd Parliament, 1st session. Retrieved from the Open Parliament of Canada 
website: https://openparliament.ca/committees/justice/42-1/10/jody-wilson-raybould-1/  
Young, H. (2016). Quebec's doctor-assisted dying law challenged. Canadian Medical Association 
Journal. 188(2), E33. doi:10.1503/cmaj.109-5208 
 
 
 
Braaten: A Post-Carter Policy Review 98 
Appendix A 
Bill C-14 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and other Related Acts (Medical 
Assistance in Dying, MAID) 
Definitions 241. 1 The following definitions apply in this  
section and in sections 241. 2 to 241. 4. medical assistance in dying means  
(a) the administering by a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner of a substance to a 
person, at their request, that causes their death; or  
(b) the prescribing or providing by a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner of a substance 
to a person, at their request, so that they may self-administer the substance and in doing so cause 
their own death. (aide médicale à mourir)  
Eligibility for medical assistance in dying  
241. 2 (1) A person may receive medical assistance in dying only if they meet all of the 
following criteria:  
(a) they are eligible — or, but for any applicable minimum period of residence or waiting 
period, would be eligible — for health services funded by a government in Canada;  
(b) they are at least 18 years of age and capable of making decisions with respect to their 
health;  
(c) they have a grievous and irremediable medical condition;  
(d) they have made a voluntary request for medical assistance in dying that, in particular, was 
not made as a result of external pressure; and  
 (e) they give informed consent to receive medical assistance in dying after having been 
informed of the means that are available to relieve their suffering, including palliative care.  
Grievous and irremediable medical condition  
(2) A person has a grievous and irremediable medical condition only if they meet all of the 
following criteria:  
(a) they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability;  
(b) they are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability;  
(c) that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical or 
psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under conditions 
that they consider acceptable; and  
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(d) their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their 
medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific 
length of time that they have remaining.  
Safeguards  
(3) Before a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner provides a person with medical 
assistance in dying, the medical practitioner or nurse practitioner must  
(a) be of the opinion that the person meets all of the criteria set out in subsection (1);  
(b) ensure that the person’s request for medical assistance in dying was  
(i) made in writing and signed and dated by the person or by another person under subsection 
(4), and  
(ii) signed and dated after the person was informed by a medical practitioner or nurse 
practitioner that the person has a grievous and irremediable medical condition;  
(c) be satisfied that the request was signed and dated by the person — or by another person 
under subsection (4) — before two independent witnesses who then also signed and dated the 
request;  
(d) ensure that the person has been informed that they may, at any time and in any manner, 
withdraw their request;  
(e) ensure that another medical practitioner or nurse practitioner has provided a written 
opinion confirming that the person meets all of the criteria set out in subsection (1);  
(f) be satisfied that they and the other medical practitioner or nurse practitioner referred to in 
paragraph (e) are independent;  
(g) ensure that there are at least 10 clear days between the day on which the request was 
signed by or on behalf of the person and the day on which the medical assistance in dying is 
provided or — if they and the other medical practitioner or nurse practitioner referred to in 
paragraph (e) are both of the opinion that the person’s death, or the loss of their capacity to 
provide informed consent, is imminent — any shorter period that the first medical practitioner or 
nurse practitioner considers appropriate in the circumstances;  
(h) immediately before providing the medical assistance in dying, give the person an 
opportunity to withdraw their request and ensure that the person gives express consent to receive 
medical assistance in dying; and  
(i) if the person has difficulty communicating, take all necessary measures to provide a 
reliable means by which the person may understand the information that is provided to them and 
communicate their decision.  
Independent Review  
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Mature minors, advance requests and mental illness  
9. 1 (1) The Minister of Justice and the Minister of Health must, no later than 180 days 
after the day on which this Act receives royal assent, initiate one or more independent 
reviews of issues relating to requests by mature minors for medical assistance in dying, to 
advance requests and to requests where mental illness is the sole underlying medical 
condition.  
(2) The Minister of Justice and the Minister of Health must, no later than two years 
after the day on which a review is initiated, cause one or more reports on the review, 
including any findings or recommendations resulting from it, to be laid before each House 
of Parliament.  
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Appendix B 
Bill C-14 Amendments Made by Senate June 15th 2016 
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Appendix C 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) 
Legal Rights  
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.  
12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment.  
Equality Rights  
15.(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.  
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Appendix D Excerpt from the Criminal Code of Canada 
Criminal Code of Canada (R. S. C., 1985, c. C-46) 
Counselling or aiding suicide 
241 (1) Everyone is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term 
of not more than 14 years who, whether suicide ensues or not, 
(a) counsels a person to die by suicide or abets a person in dying by suicide; or 
(b) aids a person to die by suicide. 
Exemption for medical assistance in dying 
(2) No medical practitioner or nurse practitioner commits an offence under 
paragraph (1)(b) if they provide a person with medical assistance in dying in 
accordance with section 241.2. 
Exemption for person aiding practitioner 
(3) No person is a party to an offence under paragraph (1)(b) if they do anything 
for the purpose of aiding a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner to provide a 
person with medical assistance in dying in accordance with section 241.2. 
Exemption for pharmacist 
(4) No pharmacist who dispenses a substance to a person other than a medical 
practitioner or nurse practitioner commits an offence under paragraph (1)(b) if the 
pharmacist dispenses the substance further to a prescription that is written by such a 
practitioner in providing medical assistance in dying in accordance with section 
241.2. 
Exemption for person aiding patient 
(5) No person commits an offence under paragraph (1)(b) if they do anything, at 
another person’s explicit request, for the purpose of aiding that other person to self-
administer a substance that has been prescribed for that other person as part of the 
provision of medical assistance in dying in accordance with section 241.2. 
Clarification 
(5.1) For greater certainty, no social worker, psychologist, psychiatrist, therapist, 
medical practitioner, nurse practitioner or other health care professional commits an 
offence if they provide information to a person on the lawful provision of medical 
assistance in dying. 
Reasonable but mistaken belief 
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(6) For greater certainty, the exemption set out in any of subsections (2) to (5) 
applies even if the person invoking the exemption has a reasonable but mistaken 
belief about any fact that is an element of the exemption. 
Definitions 
(7) In this section, medical assistance in dying, medical practitioner, nurse 
practitioner and pharmacist have the same meanings as in section 241.1. 
 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 241; 
 R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 7; 
 2016, c. 3, s. 3. 
Consent to death 
14 No person is entitled to consent to have death inflicted on them, and such consent does 
not affect the criminal responsibility of any person who inflicts death on the person who gave 
consent. 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 14; 
 2016, c. 3, s. 1. 
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Appendix E 
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) 2015 SCC 5 
 
XIII. Conclusion  
[147] The appeal is allowed. We would issue the following declaration, which is 
suspended for 12 months:  
Section 241(b) and s. 14 of the Criminal Code unjustifiably infringe s. 7 of the Charter 
and are of no force or effect to the extent that they prohibit physician-assisted death for a 
competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life and (2) has a 
grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that 
causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or 
her condition.  
 
 
 
